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The United States, among the wealthiest and most prosperous nations 
in the world, regularly fails to provide clean, potable water to many of its 
citizens. Recent water crises occur within communities categorized as 
Geographically Disadvantaged Spaces (“GDS”), which often encompass 
urban and rural areas. What is more, people of color and economically 
vulnerable populations are often located within GDS, disproportionately 
burdening these groups with the economic and public health consequences 
of failing water infrastructure. This Article provides a novel, comparative 
analysis of communities lacking potable water in Flint, Michigan, and 
southern West Virginia. This analysis highlights entrenched structural 
problems present in rural and urban contexts, as implicating compound 
socioeconomic and race-related inequalities that transcend such seeming 
geographic divides. Lastly, this Article advocates for infrastructure 
development policies that address the underlying structural issues 
plaguing GDS—both rural and urban—and examines whether the Green 
New Deal could serve as an effective solution. 
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The United States is undergoing a national infrastructure crisis, with roads, 
bridges, electrical grids, and water systems in various states of distress from overuse 
and poor maintenance.1 The sheer scale of existing infrastructure serves as both a 
testament to American ingenuity and a grim reminder of the widespread negative 
impacts caused by system failures. A network of interstate highways connects major 
cities to rural areas, making it possible for people and goods to travel freely from 
coast to coast.2 Miles of underground pipes connect major metropolises3 and 
national parks to drinking water, with some of these systems dating back to the early 
days of American independence from British rule.4 Yet despite the remarkable 
vision and vastness of this notable human undertaking, The American Society of 
Civil Engineers awarded U.S. Infrastructure a C-, noting that the infrastructure is 
largely sub-standard, showing signs of “deterioration,” and “some elements exhibit 
significant deficiencies in conditions and functionality, with increasing vulnerability 
to risk.”5  
This Article provides a novel, comparative analysis of two communities that, 
at first blush, appear dissimilar—Flint, Michigan and McDowell County in southern 
West Virginia. Flint, located in the urban flatlands of Michigan, has a population of 
 
1 See AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, 2021 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S 
INFRASTRUCTURE (2021), https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org [https://perma.cc/2UYD 
-SPXK] [hereinafter 2021 REPORT CARD] (giving U.S. infrastructure a “C-”). 
2 See generally Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 
(creating a 41,000-mile national system of interstate highways); Press Release, U.S. Senate, 
Congress Approves the Federal-Aid Highway Act (June 26, 1956), https://www.senate.gov/ 
artandhistory/history/minute/Federal_Highway_Act.htm [https://perma.cc/Z8RS-3M85] 
(noting that the legislation “turned a jumble of unconnected local roads into a national 
transportation network that stretched from coast to coast”). 
3 JAMES SALZMAN, DRINKING WATER: A HISTORY 109 (2013). 
4 Id. at 60–62. 
5 AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, WHAT MAKES A GRADE? (2021), http://www.infrastruct 
urereportcard.org/making-the-grade/what-makes-a-grade/ [https://perma.cc/VVN6-Q28Y]; 
2021 REPORT CARD, supra note 1. 
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nearly 100,000.6 In stark contrast, the southern coalfield communities in McDowell 
County are sparsely populated and tucked into the hills and hollows of Appalachia.7 
Nevertheless, both places can be categorized as “Geographically Disadvantaged 
Spaces” (GDS),8 or communities that experience significant spatial inequality. The 
term spatial inequality, or spatial disparities, refers to an unequal distribution of key 
resources—like housing, schools, economic opportunity, and public 
infrastructure—within specific geographic boundaries.9 Spatial disparities are 
created by structural forces, perpetuating historically low or limited investment by 
both the public and private sectors, resulting in a heightened concentration of 
poverty within certain communities—or GDS. GDS communities are also subject to 
interlocking systems of subordination based on race and class. Thus, vulnerable 
populations—African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, and other racially and 
economically disenfranchised communities—are too often exposed to the human 
and economic consequences of spatial disparities.10  
Adopting a comparative approach further illustrates that structural problems are 
endemic to the entire country, superseding the urban versus rural divide omnipresent 
in current policy, politics, and mainstream media narratives.  
This Article specifically uses GDS as a framework for understanding 
infrastructure degradation and economic stability, focusing on one fundamental and 
essential system—drinking water. The truth is both baffling and profoundly 
troubling—the United States, despite its wealth and prosperity,11 regularly fails to 
provide clean, potable water to some of its citizens and communities.12 Although 
 
6 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QuickFacts: Flint City, Michigan, https://www.census.gov/ 
quickfacts/flintcitymichigan [https://perma.cc/DP5D-R574] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) 
(estimating the 2018 population of Flint as 95,538). 
7 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QuickFacts: McDowell County, West Virginia, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/mcdowellcountywestvirginia [https://perma.cc/LS2L-
DWJT] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (estimating the 2018 population of McDowell County as 
17,624). 
8 Priya Baskaran,  Respect the Hustle: Necessity Entrepreneurship, Returning Citizens, 
and Social Enterprise Strategies, 78 MD. L. REV. 323, 339 (2019) [hereinafter Baskaran, 
Respect the Hustle]. 
9 Id. at 339, 345. It is important to note that disparities exist when resources are 
unaffordable, inaccessible, unreliable, or wholly absent from the community. 
10 KRISTI PULLEN FEDINICK, STEVE TAYLOR & MICHELE ROBERTS, NAT. RES. DEF. 
COUNS., WATERED DOWN JUSTICE 5 (Sept. 2019), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/ 
watered-down-justice-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T24Z-XU4M]. 




12 See Kevin Longley, Take Some Time Today to Imagine a Day Without Water, 2017 
INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/ 
take-some-time-today-to-imagine-a-day-without-water/ [https://perma.cc/BVL4-CJ44]. 
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drinking water is recognized as a core human right by the United Nations,13 many 
water systems are plagued with ongoing problems that compromise the water quality 
and lead directly to public health concerns,14 such as the well-publicized lead crises 
in Flint.15 Other systems are so dilapidated that they become unreliable, with 
frequent shut-offs and flow and pressure issues.16 This makes it impossible for 
residents to access water for routine tasks like cooking or bathing.17 
Water infrastructure crises are gaining in frequency, manifesting in GDS 
throughout the United States, like recent crises in Newark and the Navajo Nation.18 
Adding insult to injury, GDS communities are quite literally paying for water 
insecurity as the water bill unfailingly arrives on time, even when service is 
unreliable or the water unpotable.19 Such persistent failure of water infrastructure 
 
13 The United Nations General Assembly explicitly recognizes the human “right to safe 
and clean drinking water and sanitation” and acknowledged that clean drinking water and 
sanitation are “essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.” G.A. Res. 
64/292, at 2 (Aug. 3, 2010).  
14 See generally Nick Corasaniti, Newark Water Crisis: Racing to Replace Lead Pipes 
in Under 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/nyreg 
ion/newark-lead-water-pipes.html [https://perma.cc/JN2L-4W9P] (reporting an issue with 
removing lead from tap water in Newark, New Jersey); Nathalie Baptiste, Their Water 
Became Undrinkable. Then They Were Ordered to Pay More for It, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 
20, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2018/11/when-water-in-this-
impoverished-county-became-undrinkable-residents-were-ordered-to-pay-more-for-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/LBH5-FVBG] (discussing the water crisis in Martin County, Kentucky); 
Aria Bendix, 11 Cities with the Worst Tap Water in the US, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2019, 
9:13 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/cities-worst-tap-water-us-2019-3#milwaukee-
health-officials-may-have-failed-to-wan-families-whose-children-tested-positive-for-lead- 
[https://perma.cc/U5D7-RZ7N] (noting water contamination and subpar tap water in twelve 
cities). 
15 See infra Section I.B. 
16 PULLEN FEDINICK ET AL., supra note 10, at 18–23. 
17 See DIG DEEP RIGHT TO WATER PROJECT & U.S. WATER ALLIANCE, CLOSING THE 




18 See, e.g., Mona Hanna-Attisha, Jenny LaChance, Richard Casey Sadler & Allison 
Champney Schnepp, Elevated Blood Lead Levels in Children Associated with the Flint 
Drinking Water Crisis: A Spatial Analysis of Risk and Public Health Response, 106 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 283, 288 (Jan. 21, 2016), https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/AJPH 
.2015.303003 [https://perma.cc/PB9J-PDA5] (“As our aging water infrastructures continue 
to decay, and as communities across the nation struggle with finances and water supply 
sources, the situation in Flint, Michigan, may be a harbinger for future safe drinking-water 
challenges. Ironically, even when one is surrounded by the Great Lakes, safe drinking water 
is not a guarantee.”); Corasaniti, supra note 14; see also PULLEN FEDINICK ET AL., supra note 
10, at 25, 29.  
19 Brady Dennis, Flint Residents Must Start Paying for Water They Still Can’t Drink 
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carries repercussions at both the individual and community-wide level, resulting in 
deleterious and sometimes deadly health effects for American households20 and the 
economic ruin of an entire town or county.21 Increasingly, the devastating human 
consequences of water insecurity crises are borne by the most vulnerable 
populations—poor communities and people of color.22 
GDS find themselves in a difficult situation with regard to infrastructure, 
particularly water systems. federal policies championed during the New Deal era, as 
well as corporate dominance and influence, created spatial disparities, channeling 
investment into more affluent, racially homogenous (e.g. white) suburbs.23 GDS, 
unlike the growing American suburbs, were unable to partake in the bevy of benefits 
from the post-war construction boom—housing developments, highways, and new 
water and sewer systems. Thus, the infrastructure in a GDS are often invariably older 
 
Without a Filter, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2017, 9:44 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/energy-environment/wp/2017/02/28/flint-residents-must-start-paying-for-water-they-
still-cant-drink-without-a-filter/ [https://perma.cc/V4CY-GNK2].  
20 See Nadia Kounang, Study Estimates 15,000 Cancer Cases Could Stem from 
Chemicals in California Tap Water, CNN HEALTH (Apr. 30, 2019, 9:23 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/30/health/water-quality-cancer-risk-california-study/index. 
html [https://perma.cc/RR5R-MKWF].  
21 See MELISSA S. KEARNEY, BENJAMIN H. HARRIS, BRAD HERSHBEIN, ELISA JÁCOME 
& GREGORY NANTZ, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, IN TIMES OF DROUGHT: NINE ECONOMIC 
FACTS ABOUT WATER IN THE UNITED STATES 7–10 (Oct. 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/nineeconomicfactsaboutuswaterkearneyharris.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/58GC-H5ZN]. 
22 Newark Mayor Ras Baraka stated in an open letter to President Trump that “[t]his 
crisis, mainly, affects older black and brown cities with limited resources and serious health 
issues that are systemically overlooked by every level of government.” Ras J. Baraka, Open 
Letter to President Donald Trump from Mayor Ras J. Baraka, CITY OF NEWARK NEWS (Jan. 
15, 2019), https://www.newarknj.gov/news/open-letter-to-president-donald-trump-from-
mayor-ras-j-baraka [https://perma.cc/T7S2-CWNV]. Newark is still embroiled in its own 
water crisis involving dangerously high lead levels. In fact, the neighborhoods most impacted 
by the crisis in Newark “are predominantly low-income and African American.” Lauren 
Aratani, ‘Damage Has Been Done’: Newark Water Crisis Echoes Flint, THE GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 25, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/25/newark-
lead-water-crisis-flint [https://perma.cc/6PQR-MRS3]. 
23 For a full discussion of this phenomenon in Flint, Michigan, see infra Section I.B. 
This Article limits discussion to New Deal era policies. However, a number of government 
initiatives and incentives throughout history have promoted class and race-based 
segregation. See generally ROBERT O. SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR POSTWAR OAKLAND (2003) (describing the transformation of Oakland, 
California in the 19502 and 1960s, including the impact of race in the community); Michael 
E. Lewyn, The Urban Crisis: Made in Washington, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 513 (1996) (discussing 
various federal programs including the Federal Highway Transportation Act’s contribution 
to white flight and urban disenfranchisement). 
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and poorly maintained, as beleaguered local governments often lack the financial 
resources to reinvest and repair their systems.24  
After decades of divestment, GDS find it extremely difficult to make essential 
upgrades due to the high costs of such an undertaking.25 The existing funding 
mechanisms for drinking water infrastructure development often disadvantage 
GDS.26 Communities with limited local resources can apply for additional funding 
from federal and state sources for drinking water projects. However, these programs 
require a certain level of fiscal health and financial contribution from local 
government.27 Unfortunately, many GDS struggle to meet financial thresholds set 
by federal agencies to secure financing.28 
Even when effective, the existing funding regime offers too perfunctory of a 
solution,29 neglecting to treat the underlying disease that creates and enables 
repeated infrastructure failures—the economic disenfranchisement of GDS.30 Water 
 
24 See U.S. EPA, DRINKING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS SURVEY: SECOND 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 48 (Feb. 2001); U.S., EPA, DRINKING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE 
NEEDS SURVEY AND ASSESSMENT: FIFTH REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (Apr. 2013) (“Systems 
that have been unable to rehabilitate or replace mains may have proportionally more aged 
infrastructure, and therefore a higher level of need. In addition, some pipe materials tend to 
degrade prematurely . . .”). See generally U.S. WATER ALLIANCE, AN EQUITABLE WATER 
FUTURE: A NATIONAL BRIEFING PAPER (2017), http://uswateralliance.org/sites/uswateralli 
ance.org/files/publications/uswa_waterequity_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH36-SW64] 
[hereinafter EQUITABLE WATER FUTURE BRIEFING] (reporting on the impact of water 
challenges in vulnerable, low-income communities). 
25 Kasey M. Faust, Dulcy M. Abraham & Shawn P. McElmurry, Water and Wastewater 
Management in Shrinking Cities, 21 PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y 1, 4–5 (Sept. 28, 2015); 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-785, WATER INFRASTRUCTURE: INFORMATION 
ON SELECTED MIDSIZE AND LARGE CITIES WITH DECLINING POPULATIONS (2016). 
26 See infra Section II.C. 
27 The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, §1452, 
110 Stat. 1613 (1996); 42 U.S.C. §300j-12 (2019). 
28 See infra Section II.C. 
29 In general, state and federal funding sources provide additional financing for 
infrastructure improvement projects such as building or upgrading physical infrastructure. 
Although some funds like the Drinking Water State Revolving Funds can be used to 
consolidate struggling water systems to ensure continued water service and compliance with 
federal and state regulations, they are not intended to address persistent fiscal issues on the 
local level. See Drinking Water State Revolving Fund—Statutory Authority and Program 
Regulation, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/dwsrf/drinking-water-state-revolving-fund-
statutory-authority-and-program-regulation [https://perma.cc/BE87-AXZS] (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2020) [hereinafter DWSRF]. Common issues—like ongoing operations and 
maintenance costs—often fall outside state and federal funding regimes. See generally MARY 
TIEMANN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45304, DRINKING WATER STATE REVOLVING FUND 
(DWSRF): OVERVIEW, ISSUES, AND LEGISLATION 12 (2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/ 
product/pdf/R/R45304 [https://perma.cc/4PR2-9H8E]. For a more detailed discussion of 
common funding sources, see infra Section II.B. 
30 See generally EQUITABLE WATER FUTURE BRIEFING, supra note 24; GAO-16-785, 
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system failures can easily be traced to a lack of consistent and proactive investment 
in infrastructure, which is impossible for a community struggling with financial 
insolvency. Many GDS, like Flint and McDowell County, served as important 
economic engines or provided key natural resources during the war-time and post-
war industrial boom.31 In a post-industrial society, they require recovery measures 
to help stabilize their local economies and chart a course for sustainable growth, 
with infrastructure being one important component. Any effective water system 
solution must acknowledge, and work to address, the underlying structural issues of 
poverty within GDS. The continued failure to do so relegates poor communities, and 
particularly poor communities of color, in the United States to cycles of poverty and 
water insecurity.  
No single city, county, or region holds a monopoly on this wholesale failure of 
the funding mechanism to assist poor communities. Rather all GDS, whether Flint 
or Appalachia, are equally unable to access the requisite resources and funding to 
prevent further decimation of their local economies and adequately provide water 
for their residents.  
This Article uses a comparative approach to illustrate the shared structural 
issues underlying water insecurity in the United States and explores whether a 
comprehensive policy initiative, like the Green New Deal, would be a more effective 
alternative to the existing drinking water funding system. Part I is a normative 
analysis of Flint and McDowell County, drawing important connections between the 
current water crises in both rural and urban GDS. As part of this analysis, Part I 
explores historic factors that shaped spatial disparities in these two seemingly 
dissimilar locations, including the role of race and class-based policies. Part II 
provides an outline of the existing funding regime and design flaws that lead to the 
persistent exclusion of GDS. Part III advocates for national-level reinvestment in 
drinking water infrastructure to rectify the systemic disenfranchisement experienced 
by GDS and examines whether elements of the Green New Deal would be an 
effective solution.  
 
I.  COMPARATIVE GDS ANALYSIS: FLINT AND WEST VIRGINIA 
 
A.  Geographically Disadvantaged Spaces Defined 
 
Economists, geographers, and other scholars have long documented the 
existence and impact of spatial disparities, which play an important role in 
conceptualizing GDS. Spatial disparities are commonly understood as a lack of 
 
WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 25, at 16 (“Midsize and large cities with declining 
populations are generally more economically distressed, with higher poverty and 
unemployment rates and lower per capita income than growing cities.”). 
31 NICHOLAS STUMP, REMAKING APPALACHIA: ECOSOCIALISM, ECOFEMINISM, AND 
LAW 10 (2021) (chronicling that “Appalachian coal, in particular, helped fire the Industrial 
Revolution and thereafter much of the nation’s twentieth-century economic ‘progress’”). 
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resources and opportunities within specific geographic boundaries.32 The dearth of 
safe and affordable housing options or limited opportunities for participation in labor 
markets are examples of spatial disparities. These resources play pivotal roles in 
building the economic health and stability of a community. The presence of “good” 
public schools, green spaces, water and wastewater systems, and public 
transportation are all monikers of a desirable community. Conversely, the absence 
of these factors often results in the concentration of poverty within these places, 
called GDS.33  
Spatial disparities enrich our understanding of poorly resourced and 
disenfranchised communities by conceptualizing problems in geographic and 
temporal terms. By studying the presence and creation of spatial disparities, one can 
map the movement of capital and resources away from certain places over time.34 
This approach provides insight into systemic and structural challenges manifesting 
within GDS, connecting government policies and corporate actions with their place-
based impact.35 For example, under this approach, it would be easy to map the 
reduction in public expenditures and private investment in the urban core within the 
United States that began in the post-war era and continued for decades.36 
Incorporating a temporal analysis reiterates that the relevant political, social, and 
market-based forces are not static, but are often compounded over time. Thus, it is 
imperative to expand the discussion beyond merely cataloging the lack of physical 
proximity to resources and assiduously document systemic forces that impact access 
and drive divestment in GDS.  
Infrastructure is a useful tool for documenting the presence of spatial 
disparities, mapping their development and evolution, and connecting private and 
public activities that contributed to the growth of these disparities within GDS. At 
its core, infrastructure is a type of social investment, indicative of a government’s 
commitment to a place and the people who reside there.37 Water infrastructure, in 
particular, is crucial to human survival and economic health. In the United States, 
 
32 See generally Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space and Place: The Geography of 
Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295 (1999) (examining to what extend 
federal economic opportunity zones can be viewed as a neutral and effective policy choice); 
DAVID HARVEY, THE URBANIZATION OF CAPITAL: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND THEORY 
OF CAPITALIST URBANIZATION (1985); Brooke Neely & Michelle Samura, Social 
Geographies of Race: Connecting Race and Space, 34 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1933, 1933–
52 (2011); Lisa R. Pruitt, Gender, Geography & Rural Justice, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. 
& JUST. 338 (2008). 
33 Baskaran, Respect the Hustle, supra note 8, at 339. 
34 See generally DAVID HARVEY, JUSTICE, NATURE, AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
DIFFERENCE 208 (1996) (exploring difference between populations based on population and 
environmental concerns). 
35 See generally DAVID HARVEY, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE CITY (2009) (describing 
social justice applied in urban contexts). 
36 For a more detailed discussion of the movement of capital and resources from the 
urban core to newly developing suburbs, see infra Section I.B.1(a). 
37 Laura Pulido, Flint, Environmental Racism, and Racial Capitalism, 27 CAPITALISM 
NATURE SOCIALISM 3, 5 (2016). 
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the U.S. Presidential Policy Directive officially categorized water and sewer 
infrastructures as “critical infrastructure”—a term used to identify assets required 
for a functional society and economy.38 As one scholar noted, “[t]he decision to 
neglect infrastructure so that it becomes toxic must be seen as a form of violence 
against those who are considered disposable.”39 Increasingly, these disposable 
communities are trapped in GDS, the direct result of structural racism and class-
based subordination.  
This Article advocates for using the GDS framework as a timely and much-
needed vehicle to build important interlinkages between seemingly disparate 
communities in urban, suburban, and rural spaces. Legal scholars have studied the 
impacts of specific spatial disparities within communities, such as education,40 
housing,41 environmental justice,42 transportation,43 and water infrastructure.44 Legal 
 
38 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives. 
gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-secur 
ity-and-resil [https://perma.cc/JF3R-7FEP]; Critical Infrastructure Sectors, 
CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/critical-
infrastructure-sectors [https://perma.cc/UJL6-AHK4] (last visited May 17, 2021). 
39 Pulido, supra note 37, at 5. 
40 See generally Sheryll Cashin, Place, Not Race: Affirmative Action and the 
Geography of Educational Opportunity, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 935, 935–65 (2014); Lisa 
R. Pruitt, Spatial Inequality as Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, Child Poverty and 
Place, 71 MONT. L. REV. 1 (2010); Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 139 (2016). 
41 See Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of 
Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173 (2019); Norrinda Brown Hayat, 
Section 8 Is the New N-Word: Policing Integration in the Age of Black Mobility, 51 WASH. 
U. J. L. & POL’Y 61 (2016); RASHMI DYAL-CHAND, COLLABORATIVE CAPITALISM IN 
AMERICAN CITIES: REFORMING URBAN MARKET REGULATIONS (2018). 
42 Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 HARV. 
ENV’T L. REV. 459 (2002); Edna Sussman, David C. Major, Rachel Deming & Pamela R. 
Esterman, Climate Change Adaptation: Fostering Progress Through Law and Regulation, 
18 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 55 (2010); Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: 
Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 405–56 
(2006). Emily Hammond, Toward a Role for Protest in Environmental Law, 70 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1039 (2020).  
43 Edward W. De Barbieri, Community Engagement and Transportation Equity, 44 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1103 (2017). 
44 RHETT LARSON, JUST ADD WATER: SOLVING THE WORLD’S PROBLEMS USING ITS 
MOST PRECIOUS RESOURCE (2020); Camille Pannu, Drinking Water and Exclusion: A Case 
Study from California’s Central Valley, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 223 (2012); K. Sabeel Rahman, 
Infrastructural Exclusion and the Fight for the City: Power, Democracy, and the Case of 
America’s Water Crisis, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 533 (2018) [hereinafter Sabeel 
Rahman, Infrastructural Exclusion]; Nathaniel Logar, James Salzman & Cara Horowitz, 
Ensuring Safe Drinking Water in Los Angeles County’s Small Water Systems, 32 TUL. ENV’T 
L.J. 205 (2019); Tom I. Romero II, The Color of Water: Observations of a Brown Buffalo on 
Water Law and Policy in Ten Stanzas, 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 329 (2012). 
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scholars have also taken a broader approach, analyzing the intersection of various 
spatial disparities through the lens of specific geographies. Numerous legal scholars 
have written extensively on the plight of urban America, including Professors 
Audrey McFarlane, Michelle Anderson, Richard Rothstein, and many others.45 
Likewise, other legal scholars like Professors Lisa Pruitt, Annie Eisenberg, Ezra 
Rosser, Maybell Romero, and Hannah Haksgaard46 have addressed challenges faced 
by rural communities. Additionally, several scholars including Professors Stacy 
Leeds, Angelique Eaglewoman, and Aila Hoss have written on tribal and indigenous 
law topics, which often dovetail with broader rural legal issues.47 Unfortunately, 
these discourses have largely existed in silos within legal academia. By definition, 
GDS creates a cohesive category based on systemic inequality within geographic 
bounds, creating connections between communities with vastly different densities 
and geographic footprints, but experiencing similar interlocking systems of 
 
45 Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated 
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2006); Michelle 
Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2008); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN 
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017). 
46 See generally Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REV. 159 (2006) 
(investigating the law’s constitutive rhetoric about rural people, places, and livelihoods); Lisa 
R. Pruitt, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Rural, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 421 (2007) (asserting 
that the hardships and vulnerability that mark the lives of rural women and constrain their 
moral agency are overlooked or discounted by a contemporary cultural presumption of 
urbanism); Lisa R. Pruitt, Amanda L. Kool, Lauren Sudeall, Michele Statz, Danielle M. 
Conway & Hannah Haksgaard, Legal Deserts: A Multi-State Perspective on Rural Access to 
Justice, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2018) (surveying access to justice for rural 
populations in six states); Ann Eisenberg, Economic Regulation and Rural America, 98 
WASH. U. L. REV. 737 (2021) (discussing the potential of strategic economic regulation in 
sustaining rural communities); Ann Eisenberg, Rural Blight, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 187 
(2018) (proposing a definition and solutions for rural blight); Ezra Rosser, Rural Housing 
and Code Enforcement: Navigating Between Values and Housing Types, 13 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 33 (2006); Maybell Romero, Viewing Access to Justice for Rural 
Mainers of Color Through a Prosecution Lens, 71 ME. L. REV. 227 (2019) (exploring access 
to justice for rural communities of color); Maybell Romero, Rural Spaces, Communities of 
Color, and the Progressive Prosecutor, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2020) 
(discussing progressive prosecution as applied to rural communities of color and noting the 
“whitewashing” of rurality); Hannah Haksgaard, Court-Appointment Compensation and 
Rural Access to Justice, 14 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 88 (2020) (discussing the 
impacts of the rural lawyer shortage for court appointed legal representation). 
47 Stacy L. Leeds, Moving Toward Exclusive Tribal Autonomy over Lands and Natural 
Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439 (2006) (discussing the intersection between tribal 
lands, natural resources, and property law); Angelique EagleWoman, Tribal Nations and 
Tribalist Economics: The Historical and Contemporary Impacts of Intergenerational 
Material Poverty and Cultural Wealth Within the United States, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 805 
(2010) (exploring the wealth gap and intergenerational poverty on tribal lands created by 
legal and policy regimes); Aila Hoss, A Framework for Tribal Public Health Law, 20 NEV. 
L.J. 113 (2019) (offering a framework for Public Health laws as applied to Tribes). 
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subordination. From this new, broader, and more integrated sample, policymakers 
can effectively map private and public actions that can spur inequality and explore 
new initiatives that work to disassemble broken systems.  
The following sections implement the GDS framework to better understand the 
current water crises in Flint and West Virginia, including mapping the structural 
racism and economic disenfranchisement that created spatial disparities and 
continue to impact water infrastructure investment.  
 
B.  Flint 
 
In 2014, local media outlets began covering the water crisis in Flint, Michigan. 
Residents were alarmed by their tap water, which they described as discolored and 
having an unpleasant odor.48 Many residents believed the water was causing a 
negative impact on their health, citing the sudden appearance of rashes and other 
ailments.49 By January of 2016, the national media began reporting on the deeply 
troubling story of an entire American city exposed to lead contamination through 
their drinking water.50  
Ample scientific evidence has established that no amount of lead in the blood 
is safe.51 High levels of lead in children have been linked to brain damage, kidney 
failure, impaired neurobehavioral development, diminished intellectual capacity, 
cognitive development issues, hearing impairment, and a variety of other growth and 
development issues.52  
 
48 Susan J. Masten, Simon H. Davies & Shawn P. McElmurry, Flint Water Crises: What 
Happened and Why?, 108 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 22 (2016).  
49 Anna Clark, ‘Nothing to Worry About. The Water Is Fine’: How Flint Poisoned Its 
People, THE GUARDIAN (July 3, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/ 
jul/03/nothing-to-worry-about-the-water-is-fine-how-flint-michigan-poisoned-its-people 
[https://perma.cc/7N8L-5B4V]. 
50 Denise Robbins, Analysis: How Michigan and National Reporters Covered the Flint 
Water Crisis, MEDIAMATTERS (Feb. 2, 2016, 12:09 PM), https://www.mediamatters.org/ 
research/2016/02/02/analysis-how-michigan-and-national-reporters-co/208290#howmedia 
covered [https://perma.cc/2YZN-AFRF]. 
51 Emily Benfer, Contaminated Childhood: How the United States Failed to Prevent 
the Chronic Lead Poisoning of Low-Income Children and Communities of Color, 41 HARV. 
ENVTL L. REV. 493, 495 (2017). Although most reporting and the ongoing narrative centers 
on lead exposure, the Flint Water Crises also resulted in an outbreak of Legionnaire’s disease 
that proved deadly for some residents and left others with ongoing health consequences. For 
a full discussion of the outbreak and attendant consequences, cf. Nicholas J. Schroeck, The 
Flint Water Crisis and Legionella: Harm to Public Health from Failure to Warn, 18 J.L. 
SOC’Y 155, 156 (2018). 
52 Hanna-Attisha et al., supra note 18, at 283 (stating “[l]ead is a potent neurotoxin, and 
childhood lead poisoning has an impact on many developmental and biological processes, 
most notably intelligence, behavior, and overall life achievement”); see also Talia Sanders, 
Yiming Lu, Virginia Buchner & Paul B. Tchounwou, Neurotoxic Effects and Biomarkers of 
Lead Exposure: A Review, 24 REVS. ENV’T HEALTH 15, 17 (2009). 
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To date, state authorities have estimated that 8,000–9,000 children may have 
been exposed to lead in Flint.53 Adults, too, suffered health consequences from 
exposure, with numerous reports of rashes, hair loss, and miscarriages.54 Even five 
years later, many residents are still left without potable water.55 The fallout from this 
disaster was largely borne—to this day—by low-income and African American 
households in Flint.56  
The exposure of poor, African American residents to high levels of lead can be 
attributed in large part to spatial disparities. Over time, public and private forces 
enabled the concentration of poverty within the city’s borders and simultaneously 
redirected investment, including infrastructure development, to the growing ring of 
suburbs in Genesee County.57 Even before the national news coverage of Flint’s 
drinking water crisis, the once industrious metropolis known as “Vehicle City” had 
already fallen on hard times.58 Hailed as the birthplace of General Motors (GM), the 
 
53 Ryan Felton, ‘It’s Affected Everybody’: Flint Children on the Frontline of the Water 
Crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2016, 3:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/mar/24/flint-children-water-crisis-lack-of-data-lead [https://perma.cc/VJ45-
W39J] (“Still, state officials have advised that children under six in the city—roughly 8,000 
to 9,000 in total—should be treated as having been exposed.”). 
54 Ryan Felton, Flint’s Tainted Water May Have Led to Rashes and Hair Loss, 
Investigation Finds, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2016, 3:14 PM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/us-news/2016/aug/23/flint-lead-tainted-water-crisis-skin-rashes-hair-loss-michigan 
[https://perma.cc/5YJG-6DFB]. 
55 Lead lines need to be replaced in order to eliminate all possibility of exposure. Due 
to the high number of lead lines in the city, the work is slow-going. As a result, residents in 
some areas are required to use filters; but many remain understandably skeptical and use 
bottled water. See Emma Winowiecki, Does Flint Have Clean Water? Yes, but It’s 
Complicated., MICH. RADIO NPR (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/ 
does-flint-have-clean-water-yes-it-s-complicated [https://perma.cc/3SSF-SXGY]. 
56 FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 54 (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/FWATF_FINAL_REPORT_21March2016_
517805_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XAE-FA6P] (“Flint residents, who are majority Black or 
African American and among the most impoverished of any metropolitan area in the United 
States, did not enjoy the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards 
as that provided to other communities.”). 
57 See Dominic Adams, Here’s How Flint Went from Boom Town to Nation’s Highest 
Poverty Rate, MLIVE (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/2017/09/heres_ 
how_flint_went_from_boom.html [https://perma.cc/CX5L-N7EA]; Genesee County is the 
County in which Flint is located. See Maps & Data, GENESEE CNTY. 
https://www.gc4me.com/departments/gis/maps_and_services.php [https://perma.cc/BK3A-
WC3W] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020). 
58 For vehicle city moniker, see CANDY J. COOPER & MARC ARONSON, POISONED 
WATER: HOW THE CITIZENS OF FLINT, MICHIGAN, FOUGHT FOR THEIR LIVES AND WARNED 
THE NATION 13 (2020); see also Emily Bingham, Michigan History: Why Flint’s ‘Vehicle 
City’ Nickname Has Nothing to Do with Cars, MLIVE (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.mlive. 
com/entertainment/2017/05/flint_vehicle_city_name_history.html [https://perma.cc/AF9X-
GJG4]. For economic decline prior to the water crisis, see ERIC SCORSONE, PH.D. & 
 
2021] THIRSTY PLACES 513 
 
city once boasted one of the strongest-growing middle classes in the United States, 
thanks to stable wages and numerous employment options in the auto industry and 
other manufacturers.59 Some of these benefits, like wages and jobs, even extended 
to Flint’s African-American residents, although never to the same scale as white 
workers.60 In 1960, Flint reached its peak population at 196,940 residents and the 
city was majority White (82%).61  
Half a century later, the population and demographics of Flint have shifted 
dramatically. In 2014, the year of the water crisis, the population had shrunk 
considerably to a mere 99,002.62 The city was 51.5% African American, with over 
40% of the total population living at or below the poverty line—the highest poverty 
rate of any city in Michigan with at least 65,000 people.63 The consistent out-
migration from Flint began during the post-war era and continued to accelerate 
through the industrial collapse of the 1980s and well into the 2000s, with 18% of the 
population leaving the city between 2000–2010.64 As the city’s population declined, 
the now smaller and less affluent residents find themselves in an untenable position: 
Flint’s remaining population was now responsible for shouldering the financial 
burdens of maintaining the city, including its aging infrastructure.65 Moreover, this 
massive infrastructure was designed to support a far larger residential population, as 
well as the needs of manufacturing operations and other commercial enterprises in 
the city.66  
Flint’s water system showcased the practical impact of this ongoing financial 
predicament, with numerous service and operation issues plaguing the city even 
prior to the lead contamination crisis. In Flint, the average water main was eighty 
 
NICOLETTE BATESON, LONG-TERM CRISIS AND SYSTEMIC FAILURE: TAKING THE FISCAL 
STRESS OF AMERICA’S OLDER CITIES SERIOUSLY 1–8 (2011), https://www.cityofflint.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/Reports/MSUE_FlintStudy2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT8Q-2B29]; 
Kayla Ruble, The Unraveling of Flint: How ‘Vehicle City’ Stalled Long Before the Water 
Crisis, VICE NEWS (Jan. 26, 2016, 1:25 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mbn5b4/ 
the-unraveling-of-flint-how-vehicle-city-stalled-long-before-the-water-crisis [https://perma 
.cc/V72M-FC22]; Adams, supra note 57. 
59 ANNA CLARK, THE POISONED CITY: FLINT’S WATER AND THE AMERICAN URBAN 
TRAGEDY 3 (2018) (“Flint had one of the highest per capita income in the nation and, despite 
being severely segregated, it was a magnet for African American migrants from the South.”). 
60 Although African American workers in Flint still received less compensation and 
were relegated to more menial labor, the population in Flint fared far better financially than 
African Americans in other industrial cities or rural areas. See generally ANDREW R. 
HIGHSMITH, DEMOLITION MEANS PROGRESS: FLINT, MICHIGAN, AND THE FATE OF THE 
AMERICAN METROPOLIS (2015). 
61 SCORSONE & BATESON, supra note 58, at 4. 
62 LEONIDAS MUREMBYA & ERIC GUTHRIE, DEMOGRAPHIC AND LABOR MARKET 
PROFILE: CITY OF FLINT 8 (Apr. 2016), https://milmi.org/Portals/198/publications/Flint_City 
_Demographic_and_Labor_Mkt_Profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/AKM9-H6MT]. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 5. 
65 CLARK, supra note 59, at 35. 
66 Id. 
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years old, and the system lost a significant percentage of water through leaky pipes67 
and water main breaks,68 which only further compromised the aging infrastructure. 
Typically, pipes and other parts of a water system should be replaced proactively, 
rather than waiting for a water main break, as this can lead to contamination and 
negative public health consequences.69 Additionally, low pressure and water flow in 
pipes cause these parts to corrode and degrade faster, as they are designed to 
accommodate fast-moving water.70 Unfortunately, Flint’s water authority was 
strapped for cash and could not bear the financial burden of proactive replacement.71  
Ironically, although the water system was facing a major funding deficit, Flint 
residents were continuing to pay ever-increasing amounts of money for residential 
water service.72 Households in Flint had some of the most expensive water bills in 
the country,73 despite over 40% of the city’s population living below the poverty 
line.74 How did residents find themselves in this strange situation? Water rates are 
supposed to generate enough income to cover operations, maintenance, 
 
67 See ROWE PRO. SERVS. CO. & POTTER CONSULTING, CITY OF FLINT WATER 
RELIABILITY STUDY: DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 9 (Dec. 2013), https://www.michigan.gov/docu 
ments/snyder/Rowe_2013_Reliablity_Study_compressed_515343_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
V6Y2-B8LF]; Ron Fonger, 10 Easy Pieces: Key Facts About Flint’s Water System in New 
Report, MLive (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/2016/06/ten_troubling_facts_ 
about_flin.html [https://perma.cc/4CTU-BXAE].  
68 Steve Carmody, Flint to Pressure Water Customers to Pay Their Overdue Bills, 
MICH. RADIO NPR (Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/flint-pressure-
water-customers-pay-their-overdue-bills [https://perma.cc/Y8MZ-NGFP]. 
69 Marc Edwards, Understanding Flint’s Water Infrastructure Crisis: Water 
Infrastructure Inequality in America, FLINT WATER STUDY UPDATES (Dec. 9, 2016), 
http://flintwaterstudy.org/2016/12/understanding-flints-water-infrastructure-crisis-water-
infrastructure-inequality-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/8FL9-UAAL]. 
70 Id. (“Second, water moves very slowly through a pipe system with fewer people, 
which can actually make corrosion damage of pipes worse, and increase the rate of damage 
and costs for repair. Unlike highways which degrade faster the more, they are used, water 
systems can actually degrade more quickly with less water use.”). 
71 CLARK, supra note 59, at 35–36 (“Replacing them is very expensive, and money for 
infrastructure is harder than ever to come by. In 1976, two years after the Safe Drinking 
Water Act passed, federal funding provided utilities with $17 billion to keep their 
infrastructure in good condition. By 2014, that had fallen to $4.3 billion. Also, a full upgrade 
would take years to complete, extending well beyond any individual’s elected term. And 
water infrastructure is rarely a top priority for residents.”). 
72 John Wisely, Flint Residents Paid America’s Highest Water Rates, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (Feb. 17, 2016, 8:52 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-
water-crisis/2016/02/16/study-flint-paid-highest-rate-us-water/80461288/ [https://perma.cc 
/83FM-E957]. 
73 Id.; see Carmody, supra note 68 (noting the high water rates generally).  
74 CLARK, supra note 59, at 14–15 (“Long before the emergency managers came to 
town, residents had urged their leaders to relieve the burden of pricey water. Monthly rates 
in Flint were among the most expensive in the country, and yet 42 percent of residents live 
below the federal poverty level. And the rates kept rising . . .”). 
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administrative costs, etc.75 Rates are often increased to cover large renovation or 
repair projects, like burst water pipes or replacing outdated infrastructure.76 Rates 
are also adjusted if there is a significant population decline or the water system will 
face a deficit.77 As the population fell in Flint, the various maintenance, 
administrative, and operational costs were now distributed over a smaller number of 
households, thus increasing each individual water bill. Under these increasing 
financial pressures, the number of unpaid bills mounted, as did incidences of water 
theft—with desperate residents using illegal water connections for their homes.78 
Water systems are intended to be financially self-sufficient, funding operations, 
maintenance, and even reserves—savings for future projects—through water bills.79 
However, thanks to Flint’s slow and deliberate economic decline, the city could no 
longer generate the necessary revenue through water bills alone.80 The tax base had 
not only shrunk in numbers, but also changed in composition, making it impossible 
 
75 Carmody, supra note 68 (“The rates that you charge for a service should cover the 
costs of providing the service.”); see generally Understanding Your Water Bill, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/watersense/understanding-your-water-bill [https://perma.cc/D8B7-
C6UH] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (explaining the costs in a standard water bill).  
76 David Harrison, Why Your Water Bill Is Rising Much Faster than Inflation, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-is-paying-to-fix-
outdated-water-and-sewer-systems-you-are-1521106201 [https://perma.cc/X887-LJ96]. 
77 Id. 
78 Molly Young, Flint Officials Confirm ‘Massive’ Water Theft Investigation, 
Crackdown, MLIVE (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/2014/09/flint_offic 
ials_confirm_massiv.html [https://perma.cc/8L9R-9NB8]. 
79 Donald A. Forrer, Jacob Boudreau, Elizabeth Boudreau, Sheronia Garcia, 
Christopher Nugent, Dean Allen & Alexis C. Lubin, The Effects of Water Utility Pricing on 
Low Income Consumers, 5 J. INT’L ENERGY POL’Y 9, 9 (2016) (“There was a time when 
water was a commodity that families took for granted and cost was not a consideration in the 
budget. However, that is no longer the case. Increasing costs in capital, debt, personnel, 
chemicals, retrieval, and production have dramatically increased the price of water. In 
addition to the listed issues is the fact that water is becoming harder to find and maintain as 
municipalities face revenue issues that must be addressed through the pricing model utilized 
by government utilities . . . Public utilities are required to be self-sufficient by ensuring that 
income covers expenses.”). 
80 See John Counts, Flint Water Crisis Got Its Start as a Money-Saving Move in 
Department of Treasury, MLIVE (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/2016/05/flint 
_water_crisis_got_its_sta.html [https://perma.cc/K7TC-USB3]; see also Curt Guyette, A 
Deep Dive into the Source of Flint’s Water Crisis, METROTIMES (Apr. 19, 2017), 
https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/a-deep-dive-into-the-source-of-flints-water-crisis/Con 
tent?oid=3399011 [https://perma.cc/LT3V-WFXD]; Annie Snider, Flint’s Other Water 
Crisis: Money, POLITICO (Mar. 7, 2016, 8:56 PM) https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/ 
flint-lead-water-contamination-money-220391 [https://perma.cc/GY4R-7YTS] (reporting 
on repeated revenue transfers from Flint’s water and sewer fund to the city’s general 
operating budget). Revenue transfers resulted in both rising rates for residents and the 
depletion of the water and sewer funds, making it impossible to address infrastructure issues. 
Id. 
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to rely on tax revenue as an additional funding source.81 State funds were no longer 
an option due to considerable cuts in the State’s revenue sharing program.82 Federal 
funding regimes for water infrastructure were also less robust. Thus it was difficult 
for the city to access desperately needed funds from these sources.83 This financial 
predicament led to the fateful decision to switch water sources for the city of Flint.84  
The decision to change water sources was made by a politically appointed 
Emergency Financial Manager (EFM), one of many tasked with the supposed 
stewardship of failing school systems and local governments throughout Michigan 
under a controversial law.85 The EFM had the authority to make all major operational 
decisions for Flint, making both the Mayor and City Council obsolete, thus 
subrogating the democratic will of the people by eliminating their only voice in 
governing affairs—their local elected officials.86 The EFM’s directive was to move 
 
81 See generally MICH. CIV. RTS. COMM’N, THE FLINT WATER CRISIS: SYSTEMIC 
RACISM THROUGH THE LENS OF FLINT 109–10, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr/ 
VFlintCrisisRep-F-Edited3-13-17_554317_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2YM-EV9D] 
[hereinafter THE FLINT WATER CRISIS] (examining key issues that played a role in creating 
Flint’s financial emergencies); see also Snider, supra note 80; SCORSONE & BATESON, supra 
note 58, at 4. 
82 CLARK, supra note 59, at 5 (“[B]etween 1998 and 2016, Michigan diverted more than 
$5.5 billion that would ordinarily go to places such as Flint to power streetlights, mow parks, 
and plow snow. Instead, the state used the money to plug holes in its own budget . . . For 
Flint, this translated into a loss of about $55 million between 2002 and 2014. That amount 
would have been more than enough to eliminate the city’s deficit, pay off its debt, and still 
have a surplus.”); see also Peter J. Hammer, Director, Damon J. Keith Ctr. for Civ. Rts., 
Hammer Statement to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission on The Flint Water Crisis, 
KWA and Strategic-Structural Racism 8 (July 18, 2016), https://www.michigan.gov/docu 
ments/mdcr/Hammer_Peter_Flint_water_and_strategic-structural_racism_final_552225_7. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/ES6J-VXHN]. Michigan has a state sales tax, the revenue from this 
sales tax is typically redistributed to local governments to help them balance their budgets. 
The state decreased revenue sharing program and instead used the funds to balance state level 
budgets. This was a major financial setback for local governments like Flint that relied on 
their portion of the sales tax revenue to balance their books. See Dominic Adams, Report 
Says Flint Lost Out on Nearly $55 Million in Revenue Sharing in Last Decade, MLIVE (Jan. 
20, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/2014/03/report_says_flint_lost_out_on.html  
[https://perma.cc/FLZ3-2YFM]. 
83 CLARK, supra note 59, at 35–36 (“In 1976, two years after the Safe Drinking Water 
Act passed, federal funding provided utilities with $17 billion to keep their infrastructure in 
good condition. By 2014, that had fallen to $4.3 billion . . . ”). 
84 “Id. at 16 (“The city has had virtually no control over managing its most important 
resource and service, and that is the water.”). 
85 Oona Goodin-Smith, Flint’s History of Emergency Management and How It Got to 
Financial Freedom, MLIVE (May 20, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/2018/01/city 
_of_the_state_flints_histo.html [https://perma.cc/XV5K-3NKZ]. 
86 CLARK, supra note 59, at 14 (explaining that the point of the emergency manager was 
to “lead Flint out of serious financial distress” and “held the full power of both the mayor’s 
office and the City Council to do what needed to be done to stabilize the community”); David 
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the city towards financial solvency, and, as part of that directive, in 2014, the EFM 
focused heavily on the financially troubled water system in Flint.87  
The EFM’s initial focus on the water system was not completely baseless. 
Residents and lawmakers had long believed that Flint was overpaying for water 
service, provided to the city and Genesee County by the Detroit Water and Sewerage 
Department (DWSD).88 In 1964, Flint entered into a contract with the DWSD to 
provide the growing city with water, which was drawn from Lake Huron, treated, 
and then sold at wholesale prices to Flint.89 The DWSD charged more for delivering 
water across longer distances and Flint, located at the very end of DWSD’s service 
area, was charged a fairly high premium for service.90 As a more economical 
alternative, Flint and Genesee County decided to build their own water authority—
the Karengodi Water Authority (KWA).91  
The KWA was estimated to save the region $200 million over twenty-five 
years, lowering water bills for residents in both the city and the rest of Genesee 
County.92 Although the project would take nearly five years to complete, the EFM 
and other parties in Genesee County deemed it a sound investment and commenced 
construction.93 In the interim, however, the future customers of the KWA would still 
need water. Motivated by cost concerns, Flint’s EFM decided to use the Flint River 
as the city’s short-term water source.94 In contrast, the Genesee County suburbs 
continued to contract with DWSA.95 
The switch to the Flint River proved disastrous. Inadequate corrosion control 
during the water treatment process compromised the pipes, and a number of 
 
Fasenfest & Theodore Pride, Emergency Management in Michigan: Race, Class, and the 
Limits of Liberal Democracy, 42 CRITICAL SOCIO. 331, 331–34 (2016). 
87 CLARK, supra note 59, at 16 (“The city has had virtually no control over managing 
its most important resource and service, and that is the water.”). 
88 Id. at 14–15 (“Long before the emergency managers came to town, residents had 
urged their leaders to relieve the burden of pricey water.”). This sentiment was even shared 
by suburban communities surrounding Flint. 
89 Id. at 29–30. 
90 Id. at 15. 
91 Id. at 15–16. 
92 Merrit Kennedy, Lead-Laced Water in Flint: A Step-By-Step Look at the Makings of 
a Crisis, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016, 6:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/04/20/465545378/lead-laced-water-in-flint-a-step-by-step-look-at-the-makings-
of-a-crisis [https://perma.cc/8DQQ-EAPJ]. 
93 Ron Fonger, Genesee County Starts on Design of Lake Huron Water Pipeline Intake, 
MLIVE (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/2012/03/genesee_county_starts 
_on_desig.html [https://perma.cc/JN3C-3SJY] (claiming that continuing to buy water from 
Detroit will cost the region $2.1 billion during the next 25 years, in comparison to 
building a pipeline that would cost $1.9 billion over the same period, according to the 
KWA website). 
94 Bridge Staff, Who Approved Switch to Flint River? State’s Answers Draw Fouls, 
BRIDGE MICH. (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-truth-squad/who-
approved-switch-flint-river-states-answers-draw-fouls [https://perma.cc/JW5X-5PJH]. 
95 CLARK, supra note 59, at 17. 
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contaminants were introduced into the water, including lead.96 Continued oversight 
failures by state and local authorities enabled the crisis to continue until thousands 
upon thousands of residents had been exposed.97 The water in Flint was unpotable, 
yet the water bills continued to rise to cover the costs of construction for the KWA.98 
Rates became the highest in the country, despite the promise of cost savings 
motivating the switch from the DWSD to the Flint River.99 The human cost of the 
Flint Water crisis is staggering. As Dr. Mona Haddad framed it: “Increased lead-
poisoning rates have profound implications for the life course potential of an entire 
cohort of Flint children already rattled with toxic stress contributors (e.g., poverty, 
violence, unemployment, food insecurity).”100  
 
1.  Historical Factors Impacting GDS and Infrastructure Development 
 
The current circumstances of Flint’s water crisis cannot be discussed without 
revisiting race and class issues embedded in corporate agendas and government 
initiatives. Collectively, these racially aligned divestment and reinvestment forces 
heavily influenced infrastructure development and created spatial disparities in Flint, 
laying the foundation for the modern crisis. First, the corporate dominance of GM, 
the largest employer and largest consumer of water in the city, meant the company 
exerted a great deal of power and influence over local government. This corporate 
dominance enabled GM to virtually dictate the distribution of public resources to 
best suit its needs, eventually co-opting city resources to benefit GM’s suburban 
manufacturing sites.101 In addition to their financial agenda, GM also drove racial 
segregation and inequality through racist employment practices and place-making 
initiatives that explicitly excluded African Americans.102 Second, the Federal 
 
96 Terese Olson, The Science Behind the Flint Water Crisis: Corrosion of Pipes, 
Erosion of Trust, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 28, 2016, 5:46 AM), 
https://theconversation.com/the-science-behind-the-flint-water-crisis-corrosion-of-pipes-
erosion-of-trust-53776 [https://perma.cc/NZ9Z-QNA2] (describing that anti-corrosives are a 
regular addition to most municipal water treatment processes. If the water is corrosive, it can 
eat away at the pipes, compromising and weakening the water mains. Corrosion also causes 
metal to leech into the water. As the water slowly causes the pipes to disintegrate, heavy 
metals are introduced into the water traveling through the pipes. If the water system includes 
lead pipes, lead gets introduced into the water as the pipes begin to corrode). 
97 K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion Through the 
Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447 (2018) [hereinafter Sabeel 
Rahman, Constructing Citizenship] (stating that among the most egregious steps taken by 
the EFM and state officials were repeated assertions that the water met Safe Drinking Water 
Act and other standards despite selective site testing).  
98 Steve Carmody, Consultant Says Flint Needs to Charge More for Water and Sewer 
Service, MICH. RADIO NPR (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/consultant 
-says-flint-needs-charge-more-water-and-sewer-service [https://perma.cc/Z369-LQFR]. 
99 Wisely, supra note 72. 
100 Hanna-Attisha et al., supra note 18, at 286. 
101 See HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 10; infra Section I.B(a)(i). 
102 See infra Section I.B(a)(ii). 
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Housing Administration’s development agenda created huge economic disparities 
across race and class lines, channeling investments away from the urban core and 
into racially and economically homogenous suburbs.103  
 
(a)  GM and Corporate Dominance 
 
For decades, GM was the economic engine that drove manufacturing, 
employment, and prosperity in Flint and the surrounding areas.104 During its heyday, 
GM was the dominant corporate power in Flint, employing over 80,000 workers in 
the metro area.105 The region was also home to other manufacturing companies—
ranging from textiles to paint—and commercial businesses, including restaurants 
and cafes.106 Although GM was not the only employer in town, it was the most 
powerful. The company carefully cultivated a general sentiment among local power 
brokers—and even many residents—that the fates of Flint and GM were 
intertwined.107 This created an environment in which GM became an unofficial 
constituent of the City, with politicians carefully weighing how decisions—of any 
scale—would impact the car company.108  
  
 
103 See infra Section I.B(b)(ii). During the 1940s, “the FHA and local bankers rewarded 
Flint’s outer-ring neighborhoods with a rash of postwar construction . . . over four thousand 
new building permits for homes located in racially restricted subdivisions in the city’s 
outermost census tracts.” HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 139. In contrast, “by the early 1950s, 
the FHA and local lenders had redlined over 90 percent of the vacant, construction-ready 
properties inside the city.” Id. at 238. 
104 Id. at 26. 
105 SCORSONE & BATESON, supra note 58, at 11 (“In 1978, over 80,000 Flint-area 
residents were employed by GM. By 1990 the number of employees decreased to 23,000. It 
was reported to be as low as 8,000 in 2006.”). 
106 CLARK, supra note 59, at 3; HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 132 (describing retail and 
services in the Central Business District in Flint during the mid-twentieth century). See also 
Noel Bankston, Automobile Industry Growth from 1916 to 1989: The Effect on Flint, 
Michigan Climate 1 (July 2014) (M.S. thesis, Old Dominion University), 
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=ots_masters_pr
ojects [https://perma.cc/AB4R-VQCZ] (“These plants supported countless numbers of small 
businesses ranging from cafeterias, restaurants, metal fabrication companies, tool and die 
making businesses, to auto body shops.”). 
107 This view has persisted with Mayor Matthew Collier stating, “Flint is GM and GM 
is Flint.” Doron P. Levin, FLINT JOURNAL; Tribute to a 1908 Durant in the Auto’s Future, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/09/us/flint-journal-tribute-
to-a-1908-durant-in-the-auto-s-future.html [https://perma.cc/5WBT-JRY2]. 
108 CLARK, supra note 59, at 50; see also HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 91, 133 (noting 
“GM’s near-obsessive efforts to dominate local politics” and that “connections between the 
city government and the company were often so close as to obliterate any meaningful 
distinctions between public policy and private corporate interests”). 
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(i)  GM’s Suburban Strategy 
 
GM’s influence over the local government greatly impacted the city’s 
investment in infrastructure. There is perhaps no better example than the company’s 
impact on water infrastructure and consumption in the city. Industrial users 
consumed an average of 54% of the water supply from the Flint water system and 
yet generated only 37% of the revenue thanks to the favorable rate negotiated with 
the city.109 In contrast, residents used 30% of the water but constituted 50% of the 
revenue.110 Residents were, in essence, subsidizing industry with their household 
water bills. 
The period from 1940–1960 was one of rapid expansion and growth for GM, 
and the auto giant began building new manufacturing facilities in Flint’s 
underdeveloped suburbs.111 The ring of small, rustic towns surrounding Vehicle 
City, however, lacked the capacity to support manufacturing. In particular, GM 
needed massive amounts of water for production, and many suburbs did not have 
well-developed municipal water systems.112 Fortunately, Flint officials—ever eager 
to be seen as a friend to GM—were persuaded to connect these suburban facilities 
to Flint’s water system.113 Flint’s local leaders even agreed not to upcharge the new 
suburban facilities.114 New plants would enjoy the same generous rate as plants 
operating within city limits.115  
Some residents stridently opposed connecting the new suburban factories to 
Flint’s water infrastructure.116 Critics correctly cited that suburban expansion would 
not translate to economic benefits for Flint.117 The tax regime—corporate, personal 
income, and property—is a major source of municipal revenue.118 The new factories 
fell outside the jurisdiction of Flint, and thus did not generate any new tax revenue 
 
109 Andrew Highsmith, Beyond Corporate Abandonment: General Motors and the 
Politics of Metropolitan Capitalism in Flint, Michigan, 40 J. URB. HIST. 31, 35 (2014) 
[hereinafter Highsmith, Beyond Corporate Abandonment]. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 31–33 (discussing that these plants were designed to accommodate new modes 
of mechanized and automated production that were incompatible with the existing facilities 
in the city).  
112 Id. at 35 (“[O]ther municipal services generally unavailable in Flint’s suburbs.”). 
113 HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 130–31 (quoting Commissioner Craig as stating 
“without GM, Flint wouldn’t exist. I don’t believe in taxing or throwing them out of business 
. . . .”). It is worth noting that Flint not only supplied water, but also built roads to the new 
suburban factories and provided sewage hookups, as well. Id. 
114 Highsmith, Beyond Corporate Abandonment, supra note 109, at 35 (noting that the 
city did charge a flat premium rate for supplying the suburban factories; however, this 
premium was not particularly costly and the generous per gallon rate still resulted in a fairly 
significant subsidy for the corporation). 
115 Id. 
116 HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 130–31. 
117 See id. at 131. 
118 Hammer, supra note 82. 
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for the city.119 In fact, the construction of these new facilities actually reduced Flint’s 
existing revenue stream. Newer facilities replaced older plants located within the 
city.120 Additionally, the new plants featured greater automation, which meant fewer 
workers were employed in the new suburban facilities.121 When coupled with lay-
offs from the now obsolete plants in the urban core, few new jobs were actually 
created by the suburban facilities.122  
GM’s slow exodus from Flint into the suburbs altered the allocation of 
resources in the region, creating spatial disparities between the white suburbs and an 
increasingly black city. The suburbs provided almost none of the start-up 
infrastructure costs associated with the new GM plants, but reaped all of the tax 
benefits.123 Erstwhile, residents of Flint subsidized the new roads and water systems 
in the suburbs while sacrificing jobs and plants—a vital revenue source—located in 
the urban core.124 This resource divestment began slowly, accelerated, and 
ultimately resulted in the transformation of the once lauded Vehicle City into a GDS. 
Once again, the consequences of GM’s suburban strategy were felt keenly by 
African American and lower-income residents of Flint. The racial demographics 
clearly indicate Flint had more African American residents compared to the growing 
suburbs.125 Thus, as the city continued to hemorrhage financially to the benefit of 
the ‘burbs, this burden was increasingly borne by the African American population. 
  
 
119 HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 130 (noting that GM enjoyed “all of the major services 
rendered by the city, including fire and police protection; water and sewage disposal—
everything except the doubtful privilege of paying city taxes”). 
120 Highsmith, Beyond Corporate Abandonment, supra note 109, at 33 (“General 
Motors and the Politics of Metropolitan Capitalism in Flint, Michigan.”). For example, the 
new facilities featured greater automation, resulting in the closure of older plants like the 
Chevy-in-the-Hole plant—one of GM’s oldest operations. Id. 
121 Id. at 36 (detailing that “GM’s postwar expansion coincided with decline in 
employment due to automation”). 
122 Id. (“To many workers in Flint, the company’s suburban strategy seemed to amount 
to a zero-sum game in which new highly automated suburban jobs came at the expense of 
obsolete urban jobs.”). 
123 CLARK, supra note 59, at 30 (“Flint also provided water to the GM plants that were 
increasingly being built in the suburbs. The taxes paid by GM would fund the development 
of these young communities, which would eventually compete with the core city for residents 
and business.”). 
124 HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 130–31. 
125 See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES—
1930 POPULATION, VOL. I: NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF INHABITANTS, SECTION 6, MICH., 
509, 512, 521,534, 537–39 (1930); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS OF POPULATION, VOL. I: 
NUMBER INHABITANTS, SECTION 7, MICH., 22-1, 11, 16, 23–24, 26 (1950); U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, CENSUS OF POPULATION, VOL. I: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, MICH., 
24-7, 9, 25, 27, 35, 43, 45, 53 (1980) (noting the changing demographics between the City 
of Flint and its suburbs). 
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(ii)  GM Inside Flint—Racial Inequality 
 
Long before the post-war expansion—or rather, relocation—into the suburbs, 
GM was responsible for creating spatial inequality within the city. GM created and 
reinforced economic inequality along racial lines in Flint, concentrating poverty 
within African American neighborhoods. GM both diminished the economic 
potential of African American workers by relegating them to low-paying, often 
dangerous positions and enabled residential racial segregation.126  
GM actively engaged in place-making as a recruitment and retention strategy, 
creating neighborhoods that would be attractive to its workforce.127 GM invested its 
own resources in building housing and deployed its political clout to have public 
amenities placed in close proximity to its residential developments.128 For example, 
the company constructed modern housing, complete with indoor plumbing, during 
the early 1900s in order to attract skilled workers to its factories.129 The company 
offered generous home loans with low interest and required only 10% for down 
payments.130 GM even convinced the Flint School Board to place schools in areas 
housing their workers to serve as a recruitment and retention device for their private 
workforce.131  
African American denizens of Flint were expressly excluded from the benefits 
of GM’s place-making efforts. Much of the modern housing constructed by GM 
contained racially restrictive covenants to prevent integration.132 In doing so, GM 
was following a trend in the city to reinforce strictly segregated neighborhoods, a 
system endorsed by local government, other real estate developers, and real estate 
agents alike.133 African American residents of Flint found themselves compressed 
into overcrowded and poorly maintained parts of the city. Even during the Vehicle 
City’s economic prime, these black neighborhoods were subject to the bare 
minimum in public investment and upkeep.134 As the financial health of the city 
declined, the historically black neighborhoods—and their infrastructure—
deteriorated even more rapidly. The unequal investment over time would be 
reflected in the impact of the modern-day lead crisis, with older neighborhoods 
 
126 See HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 82–84, 131–32. 
127 See id. at 31–32. 
128 Id. at 32. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. (“The company also offered generous financing terms that included loans at 6 
percent interest and down payments of only 10 percent”). 
131 Id. (“In their attempts to lure young families with children, GM officials persuaded 
members of the Flint Board of Education to construct two new public schools to serve the 
neighborhoods.”). 
132 Id. at 32–34 (noting that GM attached deed restrictions). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 156 (“[F]aulty wiring, leaky roofs, overcrowding, and other hazards were 
exceedingly common in Flint’s densely populated black neighborhoods.”). 
2021] THIRSTY PLACES 523 
 
experiencing greater levels of lead and other contaminants than newer 
developments.135  
GM utilized Flint’s public resources—schools, water infrastructure, etc.—for 
its own benefit. When GM’s long-term plans no longer included investing in the 
urban core, the company slowly abandoned the city.136 Ultimately, this corporate 
dominance resulted in the concentration of poverty within the city. 
 
(b)  New Deal Era Housing Policies—HOLC & FHA 
 
Public actors also played a pivotal role in transforming the Vehicle City into a 
GDS by bankrolling the suburbs. Prior to the 1940s, the towns surrounding Flint 
were largely rural, consisting of hastily assembled, self-built houses that some real 
estate surveyors disparagingly referred to as “shanty-towns.”137 Most communities 
lacked water or sewer infrastructure, with residents relying on wells and 
outhouses.138 The metamorphosis of Flint’s suburbs into affluent, racially 
homogenous, planned communities replete with modern amenities was part of a 
larger, national commitment to suburban development.139 In Flint and Genesee 
County, carefully crafted housing policies and programs during the New Deal were 
largely responsible for the shift from city to suburbs.140  
The federal policies discussed in this Article are in no way neutral. Rather, the 
U.S. government was explicitly affirming deep-seated existing racism and class-
 
135 See CLARK, supra note 59, at 92. A large portion of the City’s older homes contain 
lead service lines. In a shocking development, only newer homes were selected for testing in 
2014, delaying the state’s ability to identify and respond to the lead crisis. Nearly 25% of 
them, came from a single stretch of Flushing Road in Flint, where the city had replaced a 
lengthy session of water main in 2007. Not surprisingly, all of those samples measured very 
low for lead. See also Paul Egan, State’s Handling of Flint Water Samples Delayed Action, 




136 For GM divesting from the city, see THE FLINT WATER CRISIS, supra note 80, at 50. 
For GM using public resources for its own benefit with regard to schools, see HIGHSMITH, 
supra note 60, at 32. For GM using public resources for its own benefit with regard to water 
infrastructure, see Highsmith, Beyond Corporate Abandonment, supra note 109, at 35. 
137 HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 28. 
138 Id. at 107. 
139 Richard Rothstein, Modern Segregation, ECON. POL’Y INST. 5 (Mar. 6, 2014), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/modern-segregation/ [https://perma.cc/ZR8D-FKEG] 
(“The Federal Housing and Veterans Administrations recruited a nationwide cadre of mass-
production builders who constructed developments on the East Coast like the Levittowns in 
Long Island, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware; on the West Coast like Lakeview and 
Panorama City in the Los Angeles area, Westlake (Daly City) in the San Francisco Bay Area, 
and several Seattle suburbs developed by William and Bertha Boeing; and in numerous other 
metropolises in between.”). 
140 See id. 
524 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
 
based bias through federal policy.141 Although the government did not invent bias, 
it helped entrench bias by providing the laws and funds to ensure racial and 
economic segregation.142 
 
(i)  HOLC 
 
The Roosevelt Administration created a series of programs designed to help 
promote homeownership and incentivize the development of new, middle-class 
communities. As the federal government worked to stabilize housing and promote 
residential development, it did so with programs that explicitly discriminated on the 
basis of race and class.143 For example, the Home Owners Loan Corporation 
(HOLC) is credited with categorizing residential integration as a significant 
mortgage risk factor.144 HOLC’s stated purpose was to refinance existing home 
mortgages at risk of foreclosure, or in active default, in order to stabilize the housing 
market.145 As part of its directive, it engaged in creating a so-called “security map” 
of Flint and 238 other residential areas across the United States.146 HOLC’s 
surveyors and administrators determined neighborhoods with the following 
characteristics were too risky for investment: class composition, presence of 
undesirable groups (blacks, foreign-born residents, families receiving assistance),147 
proximity to other neighborhoods that were racially mixed without a buffer, 
unemployment, utility services, and housing quality.148 The information gathered by 
HOLC was ultimately preserved in color-coded maps, with the riskiest 
neighborhoods marked in red.149 The FHA expanded on the system initially created 
 




143 Rothstein, supra note 139, at 5–8. 
144 See Camila Domonoske, Interactive Redlining Map Zooms in on America’s History 
of Discrimination, NPR (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/10/ 
19/498536077/interactive-redlining-map-zooms-in-on-americas-history-of-discrimination 
[https://perma.cc/3L4W-HC2C] (“In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the U.S. 
government set out to evaluate the riskiness of mortgages—and left behind a stunning 
portrait of the racism and discrimination that has shaped American housing policy . . . . In 
the late 1930s, the HOLC ‘graded’ neighborhoods into four categories, based in large part 
on their racial makeup. Neighborhoods with minority occupants were marked in red—hence 
‘redlining’—and considered high-risk for mortgage lenders.”).  
145 See The Homeowners Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (1970) 
(current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461–1468); see also Peter M. Carrozzo, A New Deal for 
the American Mortgage: The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, the National Housing Act 
and the Birth of the National Mortgage Market, 17 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008). 
146 HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 10. 
147 Id. at 40. 
148 Id. at 43–44. 
149 Id. at 39. 
2021] THIRSTY PLACES 525 
 
by HOLC—assessing neighborhood stability based on race and class—and 
categorizing (or redlining) these communities as too risky for investment.150 
 
(ii)  FHA 
 
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was created in 1934 after the 
passage of the National Housing Act.151 The FHA worked to further stabilize the 
private housing market through the use of long-term, low-interest, fully amortized 
loans.152 The FHA offered insurance on home mortgages issued by local lenders, 
reducing the risk and encouraging private banks to issue more mortgages.153 
However, FHA programs contained explicit race and class-based biases that 
excluded—or “redlined”—communities of color and low-income populations.154 
The FHA appraised neighborhoods for new investment and, like HOLC, categorized 
neighborhoods as either risky or sound investments.155 Risk was correlated to the 
presence of non-whites, dilapidated housing, quality and quantity of rental housing, 
as well as the lack of infrastructure.156 The FHA incorporated these factors into the 
economics and statistics used to create the actuarial tables and grant loans.157  
In practice, exclusion from FHA programs was explicitly racially motivated, 
with African American residents and other communities of color serving as markers 
of instability and thus ineligible for investment from the federal government. 158 The 
 
150 Id. at 10 (“Across the United States, local lenders and officials from the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) adopted the HOLC’s racist standards for measuring 
mortgage risk and systemically redlined neighborhoods occupied by African Americans and 
other people of color . . . [I]n the Flint area, redlining helped to widen economic gaps between 
cities and suburbs while hardening the color lines surrounding minority neighborhoods.”). 
151 The National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934). 
152 Id., § 203; Rothstein, supra note 139, at 5–8. 
153 This program proved very successful. See HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 45 
(“Between 1934 and 1972, the FHA insured eleven million mortgages, helping to increase 
home-ownership rates nationwide from 44 to 63 percent.”). 
154 Id. at 46 (“[T]he FHA rated residential areas . . . based on a wide variety of factors 
including a neighborhood’s economic stability, the proximity of “undesirable” groups and 
adverse environmental influences, the quality of schools and Utility Services Officials from 
the FHA did not always use the same color scheme as the HOLC, but their racial and spatial 
logic was essentially the same.”). 
155 Id. 
156 Rothstein, supra note 139, at 5. 
157 HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 46 (quoting Homer Hoyt, real estate theorist who 
worked at the FHA’s Economics and Statistics Division, as stating “[o]n the other hand . . . 
where rents are high, the percentage of owner occupancy is high, the condition of the 
buildings good and there is no race other than white, there will be found areas that rate high 
for loan purposes”). 
158 Id. at 47 (“From the 1930s until well into the 1960s most American neighborhoods 
with African American occupants simply could not obtain high enough ratings to qualify for 
either FHA-insured mortgages or conventional home loans. Even if a black neighborhood 
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mania went one step further, with proximity to these communities being considered 
possibly dangerous and unstable as well. FHA redlining practices also furthered 
class-based subordination, prioritizing new construction159 and more affluent 
neighborhoods.160  
Although the suburbs of Flint were racially homogenous (e.g., white), they 
were poor and underdeveloped.161 Thus, initial FHA investment was limited to all-
white neighborhoods located within Flint, and these locations were quickly 
saturated.162 To expand into the suburbs, the FHA began using the promise of loans 
as an incentive, forcing suburbs eager for funds and development to build the 
requisite infrastructure and attract wealthy residents to their growing towns.163 Local 
suburban governments further leveraged the promise of FHA funding to 
aggressively pursue new residential and commercial projects, issuing bonds and 
partnering with real estate developers.164  
As the suburbs were booming, the FHA’s race-based policies prevented 
significant investment in Flint. The FHA funneled money to newer, white suburbs 
in Genesee County while redlining large parts of the city.165 Thus, the New Deal-era 
housing policies disenfranchised communities based on race and class 
considerations, creating spatial inequity between the city and the suburbs. The 
combined impact of the FHA and GM was a reallocation of public and private 
investment from the urban core into the surrounding suburbs. The slow 
abandonment resulted in the concentration of poverty within Flint. The city’s 
infrastructure experienced a “death spiral”—a negative feedback cycle where 
population loss spurred rate increases leading to more people leaving the city due to 
financial hardship.166  
 
scored highly based on ostensibly non-racial factors such as utility services or access to 
public transportation, FHA officials instructed appraisers to crunch numbers to ensure a 
[low] grade.”); see id. (“According to the FHA’s leaders, neighborhoods that contained black 
people were ‘unquestionably slums,’ or well on their way toward becoming them, and thus 
ineligible for federal mortgage insurance.”). 
159 Id. (“FHA officials exhibited a strong preference for insuring mortgages on new 
homes over existing structures. Because cities contained a disproportionate number of older 
homes, the FHA’s policies thus reflected a strong antiurban bias.”). 
160 Id. at 104. (“[F]rom the mid-1930s until well into the 1950s, the FHA systematically 
redlined suburban areas that possessed inadequate building and zoning regulations, utilities, 
services, and schools.”). 
161 Id. at 28. 
162 Id. at 47 (“[L]enders and government underwriters initially . . . adhered to the 
HOLC’s approach by . . . favoring modern all-white neighborhoods in the city over poorly 
serviced, predominantly jerrybuilt suburbs.”). 
163 See id. at 108–11. 
164 See id. at 110–13 (discussing how the town of Davison “grew faster than any other 
area of Genesee County during the two decades bracketing World War II” because of FHA-
backed mortgages for homebuyers which led to more tax dollars to fund new development).  
165 See also supra text accompanying note 103. 
166 Edwards, supra note 69. 
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Flint’s water crises, and the structural forces that created it, are not unique. As 
Dr. Hadad noted in her study: “As our aging water infrastructures continue to decay, 
and as communities across the nation struggle with finances and water supply 
sources, the situation in Flint, Michigan, may be a harbinger for future safe drinking-
water challenges.”167 In fact, this grim reality has already manifested in rural 
communities, and current water troubles in Southern West Virginia very much 
mirror the experiences of Flint.  
 
C.  Keystone and Gary, West Virginia 
 
Nestled in the Southern Coalfields of West Virginia, the towns of Gary and 
Keystone are facing their own water crises. Keystone has been under a boil water 
advisory168—a typically temporary measure designed to respond to sudden changes 
in water quality—since 2012.169 In January of 2018, the town experienced a 
temporary shutdown of the water system when the central pumping mechanism 
broke.170 In neighboring Gary, cracked pipes have led to dirty, discolored water and 
unreliable service.171 Keystone and Gary are trapped in an infrastructure death spiral 
 
167 Hanna-Attisha et al., supra note 18, at 288. 
168 See Linda Golodner & Stephen A. Hubbs, Understanding Boil Water Advisories and 
Notices, WATER QUALITY & HEALTH COUNCIL (Jul. 13, 2018), 
https://waterandhealth.org/safe-drinking-water/drinking-water/understanding-boil-water-
advisories-and-notices/ [https://perma.cc/SP2K-UKZN]. In Keystone, the sustained state of 
the boil advisory runs counter to the temporary nature of boil water advisories and may be 
indicative of a larger, systemic issue. See David Horak, Aged Water Mainline, Budget Both 
Under Pressure for City of Keystone, WVNS-59 NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.wvnstv.com/local-news/mcdowell-county/aged-water-mainline-budget-both-
under-pressure-for-city-of-keystone/909713317 [https://perma.cc/F3JW-8HXR]. 
169 Caity Coyne, Reliable, Safe Water a Struggle for Many in WV, HERALD DISPATCH 
(Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/reliable-safe-water-a-struggle-for-
many-in-wv/article_212e7a0c-fb56-5dc2-b920-d924027344c5.html [https://perma.cc/7H 
6V-77AN]; Memorandum from Wendy Braswell, Staff Att’y, on Appalachian Power 
Company v. Keystone Municipal Water Works, to Ingrid Ferrell, Exec. Sec’y (Oct. 2, 2015), 
http://www.psc.state.wv.us/scripts/WebDocket/ViewDocument.cfm?CaseActivityID=4357
25&NotType [https://perma.cc/4ATS-W6RX] (documenting the water shortages 
experienced by residents due to broken pumping mechanisms or pipes, including stoppages 
that lasted for two weeks). 
170 David Horak, Aged Water Mainline, Budget Both Under Pressure for City of 
Keystone, CBS FOX 59 (Jan. 11, 2018, 4:55 AM), https://www.wvnstv.com/local-
news/mcdowell-county/aged-water-mainline-budget-both-under-pressure-for-city-of-key 
stone/909713317 [https://perma.cc/PMH2-PR73]; Caity Coyne, Broken Pump Leaves More 
than 400 Families in Gary Without Water, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (July 27, 2020), 
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/broken-pump-leaves-more-than-400-families-in-ga 
ry-without-water/article_7e6eb54e-2096-5178-8791-4da525a734b7.html [https://perma.cc 
/3LX9-FX74] [hereinafter Coyne, Broken Pump]. 
171 Caity Coyne, In Southern W.Va., Days Without Water Are a Way of Life, 100 DAYS 
IN APPALACHIA (Dec. 25, 2018), https://www.100daysinappalachia.com/2018/12/25/in-
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far too common for GDS, creating water insecurity and exacerbating the already 
precarious economic conditions.172 Demonstrating once again that race and class are 
an important feature of GDS, both towns also challenge the presumptive narratives 
of race in West Virginia. Gary had a significant African American population until 
the 2015 census173 and Keystone remains majority African American.174  
No shortage of recent prestige publications has popularized the narrative of 
West Virginia as “Trump Country”—evoking an image of West Virginia as 
exclusively white, working-class, drug-addicted, poor, and angry in the wake of 
cultural reforms that place their personal values at odds with modern progressive 
politics.175 This narrative is misleading and destructive as it erases people of color 
from the coalfields, both in the present day and historically.176 Many African 
 
southern-w-va-days-without-water-are-a-way-of-life/ [https://perma.cc/B7QF-E4R3] 
[hereinafter Coyne, In Southern W.Va.]; Coyne, Broken Pump, supra note 170 (stating that 
the latest of these water woes in Gary, WV have left over 400 families without running water 
during the COVID-19 Pandemic). 
172 See generally Caity Coyne, Once a Booming Town, Keystone Struggles to Hold on, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Feb. 18, 2018) https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/once-
a-booming-town-keystone-struggles-to-hold-on/article_fc44b588-61be-5e11-a6cf-0426213 
5dd21.html [https://perma.cc/65GC-UKDV] [hereinafter Coyne, Once a Booming Town] 
(describing recent struggles of the town of Keystone); Gary, West Virginia (WV Poverty 
Rate), CITY-DATE.COM, http://www.city-data.com/poverty/poverty-Gary-West-
Virginia.html [https://perma.cc/TQB6-JX9E] (showing the town of Gary as having 28.7% of 
residents with income levels below poverty compared to 16% of West Virginia); Samuel 
Stebbins & Michael B. Sauter, These Are the 25 Worst Counties to Live in. Did Yours Make 
the List?, USA TODAY (Mar. 13, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/03/13/worst-places-live-us-counties-ranked-
poverty-life-expectancy/39163929/ [https://perma.cc/MFE8-E7U5] (listing McDowell 
County as number four on the “worst counties to live in” within the United States). 
173 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QuickFacts About Gary, West Virginia, https://www.census. 
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/garycityindiana# [https://perma.cc/F4J8-TQZL] (last visited Oct. 
13, 2020). 
174 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QuickFacts About Keystone, West Virginia, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/keystoneindiana# [https://perma.cc/V93R-
685T] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020). 
175 Priya Baskaran, The Economic Justice Imperative for Lawyers in “Trump Country,” 
7 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER, & SOC. JUST. 161 (2018) [hereinafter Baskaran, Economic Justice 
Imperative]; see also Wilma A. Dunaway, The Legacy of Social Darwinism in Appalachian 
Scholarship, in Southern Laboring Women: The Gendered Boundaries of Race, Ethnicity, 
and Class in Antebellum Appalachia, 1700–1860, VA. TECH LIBR., https://scholar.lib.vt.edu 
/faculty_archives/appalachian_women/ethnicit.htm [https://perma.cc/HYV5-P6S6] (last 
visited May 17, 2021); Elizabeth Catte, There Is No Neutral There: Appalachia as a Mythic 
“Trump Country,” MEDIUM (Oct. 17, 2016), https://medium.com/@elizabethcatte/there-is-
no-neutral-thereappalachia-as-a-mythic-trump-country-ee6ed7f300dc [https://perma.cc/4T 
L2-NZM4]. 
176 See RENIQUA ALLEN, IT WAS ALL A DREAM: A NEW GENERATION CONFRONTS THE 
BROKEN PROMISE TO BLACK AMERICA (2019); KARIDA L. BROWN, GONE HOME: RACE AND 
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Americans moved to West Virginia following the Civil War, seeking opportunities 
post-emancipation. Even Booker T. Washington briefly worked as a coal miner in 
Kanawha County shortly after obtaining his freedom.177 African Americans were 
actively recruited by coal companies as the demand from coal—“the dominant fuel 
of the industrial revolution”178—required ample labor for mines. Although the jobs 
were dangerous and the location remote, African American workers were drawn to 
the mines by the promise of strong wages and the hopes of escaping the worst of the 
Jim Crow South.179 Between 1900 and 1940, the African American population in 
Appalachia nearly tripled, with the majority settling into communities in West 
Virginia.180 
Although the total number of African Americans living in the state has 
decreased over time, many still reside within GDS like Gary and Keystone—small, 
poor communities in West Virginia’s southern coalfields.181 Grappling with 
historical and structural forces that impacted the African American communities in 
McDowell County is essential. The failure to do so effectively erases these 
populations and their struggles, making it impossible to create equitable and 
effective infrastructure solutions.  
 
1.  Historical Factors in McDowell County 
 
McDowell County in southern West Virginia was once called the “Free State 
of McDowell”—a phrase intended to express pride and solidarity for the growing 
black community.182 The county enjoyed a high concentration of black proletariat 
 
ROOTS THROUGH APPALACHIA (2018); Black in Appalachia: Black Coal Miners and the 
Great Migration, BLACK IN APPALACHIA (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.blackinappalachia. 
org/podcast/episode/34d42dbb/black-in-appalachia-black-coal-miners-and-the-great-
migration [https://perma.cc/YU3N-DS9D]. 
177 JOE WILLIAM TROTTER, COAL, CLASS, AND COLOR: BLACKS IN SOUTHERN WEST 
VIRGINIA, 17, 24 (1990); BROWN, supra note 176, at 22–23; see also LARRY SCOTT DEANER, 
HOME IN THE MCDOWELL COUNTY COALFIELDS: THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN POPULATION OF 
KEYSTONE, WEST VIRGINIA 42 (2004). 
178 RICHARD B. DRAKE, A HISTORY OF APPALACHIA 131–32 (2004). 
179 ALLEN, supra note 176 (noting that African American coal miners earned 
approximately $118 a month in 1930, compared to an annual salary of $537 for African 
American workers nationwide); Michael H. Burchett, Promise and Prejudice: Wise County, 
Virginia and the Great Migration, 1910–1920, 82 J. AFRICAN AM. HIST. 312 (1997) (noting 
the autonomy afforded to African American miners in comparison to traditional agricultural 
work in the American South).  
180 BROWN, supra note 176, at 22–23; see also JAMES GREEN, THE DEVIL IS HERE IN 
THESE HILLS: WEST VIRGINIA’S COAL MINERS AND THEIR BATTLE FOR FREEDOM 69 (noting 
that the total number of foreign born and black-miners in West Virginia colliers outnumbered 
the total number of white miners during the early twentieth century). 
181 See also supra text accompanying note 172. 
182 Id. at 32. 
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and professionals alike,183 accounting for 30% of the population in 1910.184 In 
McDowell, African American lawyers, doctors, and entrepreneurs enjoyed relative 
wealth and prosperity compared to other parts of the American South.185 The allure 
of the “Free State” extended to the working class as well, and the number of African 
American miners rose steadily during the early twentieth century.186  
The contributions of African American miners in McDowell played a pivotal 
role in labor organizing efforts in the region.187 Leaders like Henry G. Young 
advocated for much needed reforms in the mines and challenged the welfare 
capitalism cultivated by coal companies.188 African American miners were 
“persistent unionists”189 and the bedrock of class solidarity, in some instances even 
challenging the interests of the black bourgeoisie who maintained an uneasy political 
and economic allyship with bad corporate actors.190 
Although McDowell County was home to several communities with significant 
African American populations, Gary and Keystone, served as cultural and political 
power centers for the black community in West Virginia. Keystone was commonly 
referred to as the “Harlem” of West Virginia, and was home to the State’s 
predominantly African American newspaper—The McDowell Times.191 The 
neighboring town of Gary was home to the first chapter of the NAACP and the 
State’s first African American General in the US Armed forces.192 By 1965, African 
 
183 TROTTER, supra note 177, at 17, 29–32. See also RONALD L. LEWIS, BLACK COAL 
MINERS IN AMERICA: RACE, CLASS, AND COMMUNITY CONFLICT, 1780–1980 121 (1987) 
(noting “particularly in southern West Virginia, blacks came closer to finding economic 
equality than in any other coalfield, and perhaps anywhere else, in America.”). 
184 TROTTER, supra note 177, at 66. 
185 DEANER, supra note 177, at 56, 59 (noting opportunities for home and business 
ownership in places like Keystone, West Virginia). 
186 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1965 (July 1965), 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1965/compendia/statab/86ed.html [https://per 
ma.cc/PU9K-AUWT] [hereinafter Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1965]; TROTTER, 
supra note 177, at 63; see also BROWN, supra note 176, at 22–23. 
187 GREEN, supra note 180, at 308, 334–35. 
188 See TROTTER, supra note 177, at 65; see also GREEN, supra note 180, at 335.  
189 GREEN, supra note 180, at 335. 
190 Id. at 105, 334; see also TROTTER, supra note 177, at 54. 
191 About the McDowell Times, LIBR. OF CONG., https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn 
/sn86092050/ [https://perma.cc/W9BP-QX85] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020). 
192 Douglas Imbrogno, West Virginia’s First Black General Looks Back on a Storied 
Career, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/life/ 
west-virginia-s-first-black-general-looks-back-on-a/article_c3e03763-5285-5d0c-9821-745 
1fb9897f0.html [https://perma.cc/H5EF-R4MC]; see Alice E. Carter, Segregation and 
Integration in the Appalachian Coalfields: McDowell County Responds to the Brown 
Decision, W. VA. DEP’T OF ARTS, CULTURE & HIST. (1995), 
http://www.wvculture.org/history/journal_wvh/wvh54-5.html [https://perma.cc/74A3-
QJRM]. 
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Americans composed 30% of the county, compared to only 3% of the total state 
population, lending them considerable power and influence in the region.193  
Gary and Keystone remain legacies of diversity in West Virginia, even as the 
economic power and number of residents have dwindled. Today, these historical 
places are also experiencing acute water insecurity, thanks in large part to class and 
race-based systems of oppression. Much like Flint, two forces have played a central 
role in transforming the Free State of McDowell into a GDS. First, the impact of 
extractive industries and subsequent coal-based mono-economy ensured limited 
investment in the region, creating spatial disparities.194 Second, federal, state, and 
local governments prioritized political agendas and subrogated the interests of the 
people, further concentrating and entrenching poverty.195  
 
(a)  King Coal and Corporate Dominance 
 
Extractive industries in Appalachia created exploitive systems designed to 
maximize profits, and one industry in particular—“King Coal”—emerged as the 
dominant corporate actor in the region.196 In today’s world, coal seems antiquated 
and outdated, a topic for think pieces centered on party politics.197 However, coal 
played a central role in the United States economy for much of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Coal mines in Appalachia literally fueled the 
industrialization of the United States.198 Special bituminous coal was shipped to 
Pittsburgh and other cities to fuel the huge steel mills.199 Coal was also used to fuel 
factories, homes, steamships, and locomotives.200 Industry insiders referred to it as 
 
193 Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1965, supra note 186. 
194 Nicholas F. Stump & Anne Marie Lofaso, De-Essentializing Appalachia: 
Transformative Socio-Legal Change Requires Unmasking Regional Myths, 120 W. VA. L. 
REV. 823, 829 (2018); Ann M. Eisenberg, Just Transitions, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 301 
(2019). 
195 Baskaran, Economic Justice Imperative, supra note 175, at 166–70. 
196 See generally Stump & Lofaso, supra note 194, at 829 n.42; Patrick C. McGinley, 
From Pick and Shovel to Mountaintop Removal: Environmental Injustice in the Appalachian 
Coalfields, 34 ENV’T L. 21, 27 (2004). 
197 See, e.g., Elaina Plott, Hope and Change in an Alabama Coal Mine, ATLANTIC (July 
31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/trump-coal-alabama/5662 
82/ [https://perma.cc/92HU-7XGC]; Walter E. Block, Stop Trying to Make Coal Great 
Again, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/opinion/trump-
coal.html [https://perma.cc/4DNR-VKJ3]; Gaurav Sharma, Trump Vowed to Save Coal But 
U.S.’ Largest Mining Basin Remains in Decline, FORBES (Apr. 14, 2019, 8:08 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gauravsharma/2019/04/14/trump-vowed-to-save-coal-but-u-
s-largest-mining-basin-sees-decline/#6e5d683f1d74 [https://perma.cc/24GT-EXAN]. 
198 RONALD G. GARAY, U.S. STEEL AND GARY, WEST VIRGINIA: CORPORATE 
PATERNALISM IN APPALACHIA xxi (2011) (“Coal is the most valuable mineral in the world,” 
and referring to West Virginia as the “El Dorado of the soft coal industry.”).  
199 DRAKE, supra note 178, at 133–34. 
200 Stuart McGehee, A History of Coal in West Virginia, FRIENDS OF COAL, 
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“black gold” and were determined to extract as much value as possible from the hills 
and mountains of Appalachia.201  
Coal was not a homegrown industry, but was rather dominated by corporations 
largely based outside Appalachia.202 From the late 1800s onwards, coal companies 
consolidated political and economic power, subjecting West Virginians and other 
Appalachians to legal and political systems designed to preserve the industry’s 
supremacy.203  
Coal companies focused on creating an efficient production system, one that 
enabled them to extract the natural resource from isolated regions in Appalachia and 
transport it to the end consumer with minimal costs.204 Companies consolidated 
corporate ownership of land by leveraging existing legal regimes205 and built 
railroads to transport coal to the nation’s industrial centers.206 In lock-step with land 
acquisition, companies began building coal mines and mine infrastructure.207 Much 
like GM’s auto-manufacturing facilities, coal mines required massive amounts of 
water for their industrial operations, necessitating the construction of water systems 
to service the mines.208 Eventually, the coal camps and company towns that housed 




ma.cc/2KDU-QDHW] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020). 
201 Sarah Terpstra, Coke Ovens, FRIENDS OF THE CUMBERLAND TRAIL, 
http://www.friendsofthecumberlandtrail.org/history-and-culture/coke-ovens/ [https://perma. 
cc/RW9P-XF62] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020); JACK M. HOLLANDER, THE REAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: WHY POVERTY, NOT AFFLUENCE, IS THE ENVIRONMENT’S 
NUMBER ONE ENEMY 132 (2003) (“Once called ‘black gold,’ coal truly provided the energy 
resource base of the industrial revolution.”). 
202 See generally STUMP, supra note 31, at 42 (chronicling that in the nineteenth century, 
“millions of surface land acres in addition to both mineral and timber resources were 
transferred from Appalachian landowners to absentee corporate owners”). 
203 See SHANNON ELIZABETH BELL, FIGHTING KING COAL: THE CHALLENGES TO 
MICROMOBILIZATION IN CENTRAL APPALACHIA 17–18 (2016) (discussing absentee 
landownership in Appalachia that has led to deficiency in tax revenue for public services). 
204 GREEN, supra note 180, at 20. 
205 CRANDALL SHIFFLETT, COAL TOWNS: LIFE, WORK, AND CULTURE IN COMPANY 
TOWNS OF SOUTHERN APPALACHIA 27 (1995). 
206 DRAKE, supra note 178, at 147; SHIFFLETT, supra note 205, at 1. 
207 SHIFFLETT, supra note 205, at 29–32. 
208 GARAY, supra note 198, at 37. 
209 Janet W. Greene, Strategies for Survival: Women’s Work in the Southern West 
Virginia Coal Camps, 49 W. VA. HIST. 37 (1990), http://www.wvculture.org/history/journal 
_wvh/wvh49-4.html [https://perma.cc/99KY-NL4F]. Coal companies created a tiered caste 
system within coal camps based on occupation. Id. High level employees—engineers, mine 
foremen, etc.—were assigned better housing, often connected to water system. Id. In 
contrast, miners—the most fungible class of employee—were assigned smaller, ramshackle 
housing that may or may not be connected to water systems. Id. 
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Labor was fungible and the least important aspect of mine operations; thus, only 
after securing land and infrastructure did the corporate powers shift their focus to 
hiring workers for the mines.210 In West Virginia, coal companies created corporate 
fiefdoms, building coal camps and company towns on an unprecedented scale.211 
Coal towns were intentionally designed to create “a system of closed, artificial 
communities which functioned to limit the growth of social freedom and self-
determination.”212 A coal company’s economic control over its workers was 
alarmingly comprehensive. Miners in coal towns lived in company-owned housing, 
purchased groceries and other necessities at the company store, were treated by the 
company doctor, and prayed in the company-owned church.213 Many workers were 
not even paid in U.S. currency, but received wages in the form of company scrip, 
further entrenching them in the “closed” corporate system.214 Corporate control 
extended to local politics, with workers voting for the company slate during 
elections, ensuring only industry-approved candidates remained in power.215  
Coal’s prevalence in the region effectively undercut any ability for workers to 
build economic independence, security, and mobility. Unlike auto-manufacturing, 
coal created very little additional industry within the state, trapping workers within 
the coal-based mono-economy.216 The complexity of auto manufacturing created a 
market for smaller manufacturers specializing in everything, from ball bearings to 
fabric.217 The network of manufacturing outlets also fostered retail and other service-
based businesses in urban areas.218 In stark contrast, the coal companies effectively 
owned the majority of the central business district in their company towns, owning 
both the mines as well as the main street.219 “As raw materials, natural resources, 
and wealth flowed out of West Virginia for over a century, the companies reinvested 
only the bare minimum required to keep the system operational.”220 When the mines 
 
210 SHIFFLETT, supra note 205, at 32 (“With the purchases of land and mineral rights 
and the laying of railroad lines, the coal operators could turn their attention to the subsequent 
stages of hiring labor . . . ”). 
211 DRAKE, supra note 178, at 147. 
212 SHIFFLETT, supra note 205, at 1 (citation omitted). 
213 DRAKE, supra note 178, at 147–48; STEVEN STOLL, RAMP HOLLOW: THE ORDEAL 
OF APPALACHIA 213 (2017); GREEN, supra note 180, at 21 (noting “more West Virginia 
miners lived in company housing than in any other section of the country—nearly 79%.”). 
214 DRAKE, supra note 178, at 147–48. 
215 See RONALD D. ELLER, UNEVEN GROUND: APPALACHIA SINCE 1945 33–35 (2008). 
216 Stump & Lofaso, supra note 194, at 829. 
217 See supra Section I.B.1.(a). 
218 See generally DRAKE, supra note 178, at 133–34 (comparing the development of 
additional industries in Pittsburgh to the limited development of coaltowns in neighboring 
West Virginia); see also CLARK, supra note 59, at 3; HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 132 (the 
development of a robust central business district and other industries in Flint, Michigan). 
219 See DRAKE, supra note 178, at 147. In contrast, Flint was home to a vibrant, 
independent commercial sector which benefitted from employees from GM and other 
manufacturing, but was not literally owned by them. See supra Section I.B.1.(a). 
220 RONALD D. ELLER, MINERS, MILLHANDS, AND MOUNTAINEERS: 
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failed to be profitable, the companies began abandoning the communities they had 
quite literally created.221 The towns of Gary and Keystone illustrate the impact of 
corporate abandonment in creating GDS in West Virginia’s southern coalfields.  
 
(i)  Corporate Control: Gary, West Virginia and  U.S. Steel 
 
The town of Gary actually began as a series of coal camps attached to various 
mines owned by U.S. Steel.222 U.S. Steel was committed to the concept of vertical 
integration—where a firm controls the entire supply chain for its production, 
distribution, and marketing.223 By owning or controlling the various raw materials 
needed for protection, means of transport, production facilities, and distribution 
channels—vertical integration shielded U.S. Steel from outside pressures.224 In the 
late 1800s, U.S. Steel turned its attention to securing an important raw material for 
steel production—metallurgical coal.225 Fortunately, West Virginia possessed both 
rich deposits of metallurgical coal and railroads, enabling easy shipment to steel 
manufacturing facilities in Pittsburgh, Indiana, and beyond.226 On December 31, 
 
INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE APPALACHIAN SOUTH 1880–1930 196–98 (1982); Baskaran, 
Economic Justice Imperative, supra note 175, at 168. 
221 For a detailed discussion of one such example of this phenomenon, see infra Section 
II.C.1.(a)(ii) discussing the corporate abandonment of Gary, West Virginia—a town created 
by U.S. Steel; see also Nelson Sorah, Newest City Is Company Town, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE-MAIL (Jan. 14, 1971) https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5411085-Gary-
Archive-Scan-Rotated-Edited.html [https://perma.cc/M84P-CGDA]; Coyne, In Southern 
W.Va., supra note 171. 
222 Caity Coyne, Stirring the Waters: In Southern WV, Days Without Water Are a Way 
of Life, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/rep 
ort_for_america/stirring-the-waters-in-southern-wv-days-without-water-are-a-way-of-life 
/article_a1f7e3fd-d98f-5684-9fc5-d0c8b0a18713.html [https://perma.cc/6XSQ-ETTE] 
[hereinafter Coyne, Stirring the Waters] (“[T]he Gary area was a web of small towns and 
hollows surrounded by more than a dozen coal mines, all owned and operated by U.S. Steel 
Corporation.”). 
223 GARAY, supra note 198, at xi–xii (“Originally Carnegie Steel Company, U.S. 
company, Steel rose to a new form of corporate entity because of its acquisitions. Carnegie 
Steel was known as an integrated (or, more precisely, a ‘vertically integrated’) corporation, 
meaning that Andrew Carnegie through the years had acquired either outright ownership of 
or exclusive access to everything needed ‘to make the firm immune to outside business 
pressures.’ Carnegie controlled the sources of raw material (coal and iron ore, for example) 
necessary for steelmaking; the transportation systems (by land and water) needed to move 
the raw materials; the steel plants themselves; the systems for delivering his company’s full 
line of manufactured products; and the distribution, marketing, and sale of those products. 
Thus, U.S. Steel inherited from Andrew Carnegie a sprawling integrated corporate enterprise 
that was virtually self-sufficient from top to bottom.”) (citations omitted). 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 14–15 (discussing U.S. Steel’s founder, Andrew Carnegie purchasing stock in 
a coal company in 1882).  
226 Tyler G. Moore, A Southern West Virginia Mining Community Revisited, 38 
 
2021] THIRSTY PLACES 535 
 
1901, U.S. Steel secured the rights to mine 50,000 acres of land in West Virginia’s 
McDowell County, including the area that would eventually become the town of 
Gary, and arranged for transportation with the N&W Railway.227 U.S. Steel created 
a subsidiary, U.S. Coal and Coke Company (USSC), tasked with the construction 
and operation of the mines. USSC built the mines themselves, the coke ovens to 
process the metallurgical coal, and the water infrastructure that connected the 
various mines to the Tug River.228 As the mines began to take shape, USSC also 
planned and constructed several coal camps to house workers in the early 1900s.229  
USSC constructed coal camps and, like many coal towns across Appalachia, 
the company exercised near complete control over the lives of residents.230 The 
towns were carefully crafted examples of welfare capitalism—provided minimal 
amenities as a means to secure worker loyalty and dependence on the company.231 
USSC owned the land and built the homes workers rented from the company,232 
conveniently deducted from their company paychecks.233 The lion’s share of the 
amenities was reserved for the company’s foremen and engineers—well designed 
and spacious homes that had the added luxury of being connected to the water 
infrastructure that primarily served the mines.234 The average miner was—in 
keeping with welfare capitalism—assigned more basic quarters with no running 
water and outhouses.235  
In all other respects—from local commerce to governance—the USSC coal 
towns followed a familiar pattern long-established by extractive industries in 
 
SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 1, 4 (1998) (noting that the quality of the coal made it suitable 
for multiple markets extending “from the Eastern seaboard to the Midwest and Great 
Lakes”). 
227 GARAY, supra note 198, at 34 (“[E]ffective December 31, 1901, of 50,000 acres of 
land in McDowell County for coal mining and coke production. Both coal and coke had to 
be shipped via the N&W ‘and its designated connections’ with ‘guaranteed freight rates as 
favorable as those of other routes and coal fields.”). 
228 See also Coyne, In Southern W.Va., supra note 171; GARAY, supra note 198, at 37. 
229 GARAY, supra note 198, at 35–37. 
230 Id. at xiii (“Gary’s population was bound inextricably to the fortunes of its colossus, 
benevolent patriarch, U.S. Steel. The ‘company,’ as U.S. Steel was known in these parts, 
integrated the needs and requirements of a commercial enterprise with those of a diverse 
population.”) (emphasis added). 
231 GREEN, supra note 180, at 308 (describing corporate welfare); DAVID 
MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND 
AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865–1925 238 (1987) (describing corporate concern about 
welfare); GARAY, supra note 198, at 57. 
232 See Sorah, supra note 221; GARAY, supra note 198, at 39–41. 
233 GARAY, supra note 198, at 45–46. 
234 See MARGARET M. MULROONEY, A LEGACY OF COAL: THE COAL COMPANY TOWNS 
OF SOUTHWESTERN PENNSYLVANIA 59 (1989); GARAY, supra note 198, at 39 (noting that 
housing with indoor bathrooms were reserved for superintendents and mine foremen). 
235 ELLER, supra note 220, at 183–90; see also BROWN, supra note 176, at 19 
(discussing U.S. Steel’s interests in pursuing welfare capitalism to discourage unionizing and 
promote “docile bodies”). 
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Appalachia.236 Workers and their families would buy dry goods, food tools, cloth, 
and other household items at the company store, often making purchases on credit 
against their future wages.237 The wages issued by USSC could also be deceptive as 
USSC made a number of deductions before issuing wages, including rental fees for 
assigned company housing, a flat-rate deduction for employing the town doctor, and 
deductions for the amount owed to the company store to cover the “credit” 
purchases.238 The remaining amount issued in actual wages could be less than $1.239 
The coal camps had no elected officials, but were overseen by a Superintendent—
an official from USSC.240 The town was the property of the coal company, and the 
Superintendent could evict workers from company housing for poor performance in 
the mines or attempting to unionize.241 
As important places for industrialized America, both Gary and Flint rose to 
prominence in the 1940s as the war machine required steel for tanks, planes, ships, 
bombs, fencing, and a myriad of other steel products.242 During the post-war period, 
both places continued enjoying economic prosperity and faced mounting pressures 
due to automation. Coal production in McDowell County boomed in the 1950s, but 
increasing mechanization resulted in changes to the workforce.243 By the early 
1960s, families began leaving Gary, and by the late 1960s, early signs of global 
capitalism’s impact on West Virginia’s coal industry began manifesting.244  
 
236 Workers and their families would buy dry goods, food, tools, cloth, and other 
household items at the company store, often making purchases on credit against their future 
wages. 
237 GARAY, supra note 198, at 45–46. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 46. 
240 Id. at 44 (detailing the responsibilities as general superintendent were not unlike 
those of a small-town mayor). Supervisors were “accountable to U.S. Steel for Gary’s 
‘mining operation and the physical infrastructure that supported the mining operation 
including the miners’ houses, roads, sidewalks, sanitation, and garbage collections.’” Id. He 
was also authorized to evict residents from their homes based on his assessments of their job 
performance. Id. 
241 ELLER, supra note 220. 
242 GARAY, supra note 198, at 61–62; see supra text accompanying note 106. 
243 Mark Myers, Coal Mechanization and Migration from McDowell County, West 
Virginia, 1932–1970 84 (2001) (M.A. thesis, East Tennessee State University), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/eeff/af6fd36908bd547d9bf5fac5e1cf427b1ac8.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9PEY-SDKE] (“Throughout the late 1950s the coal industry in West Virginia 
continued to decline in both production and employment. Production fell from approximately 
126 million tons in 1955 to about 112 million tons in 1960. More importantly, employment 
fell from 47,149 in 1955 to 35,089 in 1960. By 1960 coal mining was almost a completely 
mechanized process. Of the approximately 112 million tons produced in 1960, about ninety-
nine million tons, or eighty-nine percent, was machine loaded, mostly by the continuous 
mining machine. McDowell County also followed the path to complete mechanization.”); id. 
at 80 (“By 1950 the expansion of mechanical loading continued in McDowell County.”). 
244 GARAY, supra note 198, at 213–16 (“Gary, West Virginia, for all that it gave the 
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Of course, the impact of King Coal’s labor policies often had an outsized effect 
on African American mine workers. African American miners “were often the first 
men to be fired and the last to be rehired by the bosses who had once praised their 
loyalty & productivity.”245 The welfare capitalism of the benevolent company was 
merely window dressing and many African American miners found themselves 
discarded by U.S. Steel.246  
 
(ii)  Corporate Abandonment of Gary, West Virginia 
 
By the late 1960s, the combination of changes in the global economy and 
mining technology translated to a shrinking population in Gary.247 Schools, theaters, 
recreation halls, and even company stores began closing as USSC began the quiet 
but steady process of separating itself from the coal towns.248 By December 1969, 
local political leaders and USSC officials began the process of formally 
incorporating Gary as a municipality.249 U.S. Steel began offering company houses 
for sale, giving “[c]ompany employees, widows, and pensioners first choice” before 
offering the homes to the general public.250 In July 1971, the deal was done and Gary 
was no longer a company town.251 In a final public act of supposed benevolence, 
U.S. Steel provided the town with severance for its many years of loyal service—
gifting the town $20,000 to serve as “start-up revenue” and handing over various 
aging buildings and other infrastructure.252 The largest and most important piece of 
this infrastructure “donation” were deeds to the water and wastewater systems.253  
U.S. Steel’s advocacy and support for the formal incorporation of Gary was not 
a benevolent measure to support greater democracy in the coalfields. The company’s 
desire to sever itself from Gary and the mines was a purely financial decision. The 
1970s and 1980s marked a continued decline in coal production and jobs in the 
region,254 siphoning what little economic stability remained in the southern 
 
world, is known to few now. It is a symbol of industrial obsolescence. Coal was Gary’s heart 
and soul. The mineral wealth of all the coal that was carried from Gary was enormous. But 
coal mining was Gary’s singular industry and the economic foundation on which the 
livelihood of everyone who ever lived in Gary depended. The town literally had nothing else 
going for it. Gary’s geographical boundaries would have prevented it from becoming much 
else than what it was. Fact is, had there been no coal, there would have been no Gary.”). 
245 GREEN, supra note 180, at 335. 
246 BROWN, supra note 176, at 174. 
247 GARAY, supra note 198, at 100–03. 
248 Id. at 102–03. 
249 Id. at 103. 
250 Id.  
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 104 (“U.S. Steel donated several aging company buildings to the new city of 
Gary, but many of its remaining structures simply were demolished.”). 
253 Id.  
254 Id. at 117 (“Charles Davis noted in his well-researched study of McDowell County 
coal mining that ‘the 1970s began with a generally downward trending of coal production in 
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coalfields. By 1986, U.S. Steel had closed the last mines surrounding Gary, 
devastating the remaining population as the coal-based mono-economy had ensured 
no substantial employment alternatives.255 The lack of employers certainly impacted 
individuals, and translated to financial disaster for the region which lost the only 
significant corporate taxpayer. But U.S. Steel took more than jobs and tax revenue 
when they closed the mines; they also took the last of the trained engineers needed 
to maintain the water system.256 Gary, like many other GDS, found itself poorer, 
smaller, and saddled with aging infrastructure it could no longer afford to operate or 
repair.  
 
(iii)  Long-Term Consequences of King Coal—Keystone, West 
Virginia 
 
Much like Gary, Keystone was another coal town nestled in the rich coalfields 
of McDowell County. The city boasted a large African American population from 
its outset, offering opportunities for entrepreneurship, homeownership, and full 
enfranchisement.257 Keystone was called the Harlem of Coal Country and often 
rivaled Gary in the 1920s to become the epicenter of black culture in West 
Virginia.258 Keystone was named after the Keystone Coal & Coke Company which 
employed many of the town’s workers. Unlike Gary, the town was formally 
incorporated fairly quickly in 1909,259 but was still subject to an elevated level of 
corporate control and influence. For example, Keystone Coal & Coke Company still 
owned much of the housing, as well as the water infrastructure.260 
As with so many places in central Appalachia, Keystone depended on the coal 
for jobs and tax revenue, and suffered economically as the industry began to decline. 
The coal severance taxes paid by companies in the area “were not substantial enough 
to set Keystone up for long-term success.”261 The town was also rocked by a 
 
southern West Virginia.’”) (citing Charles Peter Davis, The Impact of the Coal Industry on 
McDowell County, West Virginia 91–92 (1997) (M.A. thesis, San Jose State University)). 
255 Mark Paxton, Depopulated Coal Towns, Once Thriving, Head Toward Bottom, L.A. 
TIMES (July 8, 1990, 12:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-07-08-mn-
83-story.html [https://perma.cc/PWN6-LE8D]. 
256 Coyne, Stirring the Waters, supra note 222 (“Without company support, there was 
no one left to maintain utility systems—trained engineers were some of the first to leave 
when coal mines began shutting down.”). 
257 DEANER, supra note 177, at 59–61. 
258 Id.  
259 DEANER, supra note 177, at 13. 
260 Coyne, Once a Booming Town, supra note 172. 
261 Caity Coyne, ‘That’s Just How Things Go in Keystone’: Water Woes Indicative of 
Town’s Troubles, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (June 1, 2019), https://www.wvgazettemail. 
com/news/that-s-just-how-things-go-in-keystone-water-woes/article_9689f5c8-4857-58b3-
aabb-88dca2f8dc8f.html [https://perma.cc/LU3E-95L8] [hereinafter Coyne, That’s Just 
How Things Go in Keystone]. 
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significant banking scandal, resulting in a federal investigation in the 1990s, which 
dealt another economic blow to the already beleaguered town.262  
Present-day Keystone is home to less than 200 residents, 58% of whom are 
African American.263 The majority of residents are in a financially difficult situation, 
with 40% living in poverty.264 City services, like police and maintenance, have been 
drastically reduced; issues plague the drinking water system which was built at the 
turn of the nineteenth century by Keystone Coal & Coke Company.265 The Keystone 
water system includes a web of underground pipes made from an assortment of 
materials, including terracotta, steel, and concrete; it has not been well 
maintained.266  
Today, the town is water insecure as burst water mains regularly leave residents 
without water for a week or more.267 The water, when flowing, must be boiled as 
cracks in the pipes and the lack of a water system operator for the town means the 
water quality cannot meet safety standards.268 Coal trucks still pass through 
Keystone, though the companies they work for fall well outside the tax jurisdictions 
of the town itself.269 During illegal turn-offs, the pressure they cause during illegal 
leads buried pipes to burst from the pressure, further distressing the town’s 
vulnerable infrastructure.270 
 
(b)  Government Failures in West Virginia 
 
Although corporate dominance was the primary factor in creating GDS in 
McDowell County, the FHA and HOLC also played a role. Much like African 
American communities in urban areas, coal camps were largely excluded and 
redlined by the FHA.271 Instead, the ring of new suburbs surrounding Charleston, 
Wheeling, and Huntingdon—a larger urban center in this extremely rural state—
received the bulk of FHA support.272 
The more pernicious government actions that economically hobbled West 
Virginia and many other Appalachian communities were largely the domain of state 
and local actors. In fact, coal’s corporate dominance was facilitated by “local 
 
262 Jeffrey Cohan & Jonathan D. Silver, A West Virginia Coal Town’s Boom Turns to 
Bust, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 20, 1999), http://old.post-gazette.com/regionstate/199910 
20knox1.asp [https://perma.cc/JFF2-RB6D]. 
263 About Keystone, WV, VIZBUILDER, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/keystone-wv/ 
[https://perma.cc/32RY-C677] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020). 
264 Id. 





270 Id.  
271 JERRY B. THOMAS, AN APPALACHIAN NEW DEAL: WEST VIRGINIA IN THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION 207 (1998). 
272 Id. at 206–08. 
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elites,”273 the educated and powerful members of Appalachian society. These local 
power brokers engineered an environment that protected corporate abuse at the 
expense of Appalachian communities,274 serving as brokers and agents for absentee 
corporations.275 Appalachian elites held positions of formal and informal influence 
through a mixture of civil service appointments, high-level employment in the 
industry, elected posts, as well as general economic control over local 
communities.276 Their ubiquitous control continues to encompass local school 
boards, county commissions, the state legislature, and even the Governorship.277  
Appalachian communities were trapped between two strong, interwoven forces 
that controlled economic and political power in the region, and they channeled this 
influence to best serve their own agendas.278 The coal industry’s corporate 
dominance was engineered to create a system of economic dependency, ensuring 
maximum financial return from a captive labor force with few employment 
alternatives.279 Money flowed out of Appalachia along with the coal, leaving the 
region with limited financial resources. Local government and the democratic 
process, which should have enabled some form of representation and protection for 
 
273 JOHN R. BURCH JR., OWSLEY COUNTY, KENTUCKY AND THE PERPETUATION OF 
POVERTY 11 (2008). 
274 DAVID CORBIN, LIFE, WORK, AND REBELLION IN THE COAL FIELDS: THE SOUTHERN 
WEST VIRGINIA MINERS, 1880–1922 5–7, 10–13 (1981). 
275 SHIFFLETT, supra note 205, at 27; see ELLER, supra note 220, at 54–58. 
276 Moore, supra note 226, at 2, 9. 
277 The political factions that controlled West Virginia politics during the early 
twentieth century were deeply connected to the coal establishment. Throughout the early 
years of the industry, the political establishment protected the interests of coal operators by 
controlling both members of the United States Congress and the governor. Mancur Olson, 
Jr., Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force, 23 J. ECON. HIST. 529 (1963); JOHN ALEXANDER 
WILLIAMS, WEST VIRGINIA: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 121–22 (1976); CORBIN, supra note 
274, at 13–14. Current West Virginia Governor, Jim Justice, is a mine owner who has a 
history of mine-safety violations and accusations of environmental pollutions. Dylan 
Stafford & Grace Hauck, Who Is Jim Justice, the West Virginia Governor Who Switched 
Parties?, CNN POLITICS (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/politics/jim-
justice-west-virginia-governor-party-switch [https://perma.cc/CNP8-Y6PX]; see also Mark 
Olalde, Coal Tycoon Governor Jim Justice Uses Loophole to Leave Mines and Workers Idle, 
CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.climatechangenews.com/2018/03/26/ 
coal-tycoon-governor-jim-justice-uses-loophole-leave-mines-workers-idle/ [https://perma. 
cc/JW3R-WUYE]; Lacie Pierson, WV Supreme Court Rules Justice Coal Company Didn’t 




278 ELIZABETH CATTE, WHAT YOU ARE GETTING WRONG ABOUT APPALACHIA 43 
(2018) (“[W]hat actually came to the mountains was a vast system of economic exploitation, 
facilitated through violence and malice both by outside developers and compliant local 
elites.”); Baskaran, Economic Justice Imperative, supra note 175. 
279 CATTE, supra note 278, at 43; Baskaran, Economic Justice Imperative, supra note 
175. 
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the general populace, had been co-opted by Appalachian elites for their own personal 
gain. Under this system, corporations became the true constituency of local officials, 
to the continued detriment of individual Appalachians. The combined actions of 
Appalachian elites and King Coal played an essential role in the creation of spatial 
disparities. Money and resources continued leaving the region, with limited 
reinvestment, resulting in the concentration of poverty and lack of resources 
indicative of GDS.  
 
D.  GDS and Water Infrastructure—A Structural Problem 
 
The previous normative discussion establishes the existence of spatial 
disparities in urban, suburban, and rural areas. This baseline analysis is important as 
it connects cycles of poverty to key structural forces, as opposed to specific 
geographies or populations. Thus, the systemic issues that plague Flint also impact 
the Appalachian towns of Gary and Keystone.280 Additionally, this comparative 
approach highlights the presence of compound oppressions within GDS.  
While they have their own distinct conditions and nuances, ultimately, the 
communities in Flint and southern West Virginia are also subject to interlocking 
systems of subordination based on race and class. These systems of subordination 
created a plethora of adverse effects, including eroding economic stability through 
employment and wealth-building restrictions, restricting the civil liberties of the 
population, and even endangering general health and safety. Systems of 
subordination arise when individual oppressive forces are interwoven, amplifying 
their impact in already disenfranchised GDS communities. In this particular context, 
various government actions created and perpetuated structural inequality within 
GDS. As a prime example, the Fair Housing Administration incorporated and 
codified racism and class bias in its programming, connecting economic worth to 
whiteness and affluence. These standards heavily impacted both Flint’s urban core 
and West Virginia’s coal towns by excluding them from participating in essential 
wealth-building programs. The legacy of this exclusion continues to reverberate in 
these communities deemed “unworthy” by their own government. Likewise, local 
governments’ complicity in enabling corporate dominance disenfranchised 
individual workers and entire communities in an effort to please corporate interests. 
The companies—GM and U.S. Steel—entered into marriages of convenience with 
localities, extracting resources and benefits and ultimately abandoning these spaces 
once they no longer proved profitable. 
The assumptions that interlocking systems of subordination are somehow 
accidental must be confronted and refuted. While some laws, regulations, policies, 
or corporate plans may not explicitly seek to achieve class oppression or racist 
objectives, a valuation proposition is integral to these public and private actions. By 
valuing some things—whiteness, affluence—and devaluing other things—
communities of color, low-income groups—the system creates inequality. This 
 
280 It is important to note that such systemic issues are not homogenized or directly 
interchangeable per a materialist approach.  
542 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
 
inequality then manifests on both the individual level, reflected as household 
income, and on the community level as spatial disparities. Compounded over time, 
inequality widens the opportunity and resource gaps between the “worthy” and 
“unworthy” population, concentrating the latter within GDS. 
Today, GDS have reached a critical juncture with no clear path forward. Most 
GDS have experienced precipitous declines in population and municipal revenue, 
negatively impacting income once generated by water bills. As GDS have lost 
population, fewer rate-payers are left to shoulder the costs of operating and 
maintaining the water system, making drinking water more expensive per capita.281 
Approximately 75% to 80% of the infrastructure costs associated with water systems 
are fixed costs used to cover operations and capital reserves.282 This predicament 
alone is very challenging for beleaguered local governments, most of whom struggle 
to find funds for an array of key services—like schools, transit, and police—on their 
extremely limited resources.283 The problem is further exacerbated by the physical 
infrastructure itself, which was often designed to meet the needs of a larger 
population and corporate interests, but is now presently difficult to adapt and 
repurpose.284 
For example, industrial cities like Detroit and Flint provided water to 
manufacturing facilities within city limits, which produced several important 
sources of income at the time. First, the manufacturers did purchase water—albeit 
at a discount—and contributed to the city’s revenue through water bills. The 
corporations also contributed to the municipal coffers through corporate taxes and 
 
281 Faust et al., supra note 25, at 4. 
282 BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., SAFEGUARDING WATER AFFORDABILITY 15 (2017), 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-Infrastructure-Safeguarding-
Water-Affordability.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQD2-4EZT]. 
283 Faust et al., supra note 25, at 6 (“For other infrastructure Services, which rely largely 
on tax basis, the lower average income results in a tax base that is decreasing not only due to 
rban decline but also do the lower incomes of existing residents.”). See also ALAN MALLACH 
& ERIC SCORSONE, PH.D., CTR. FOR CMTY. PROGRESS, LONG-TERM STRESS AND SYSTEMIC 
FAILURE: TAKING SERIOUSLY THE FISCAL CRISIS OF AMERICA’S OLDER CITIES 13–14 (2011) 
https://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/paper-
mallach-scorsone.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U8F-DXGZ]. The COVID-19 pandemic has only 
increased financial pressures on distressed municipal budgets, leading to even more cuts to 
essential services. Jim Zarroli, Cities Have Never Seen a Downturn Like This, and Things 
Will Only Get Worse, NPR (May 20, 2020, 3:46 PM) https://www.npr.org/2020/05/20/8597 
13720/american-cities-and-towns-face-financial-challenges-during-the-pandemic [https:// 
perma.cc/3JHU-TQ7G]; Adam Harris, The Other Way the Coronavirus Will Ravage Our 
Cities, ATLANTIC: POLITICS (Apr. 1, 2020); https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/20 
20/04/coronavirus-cities-bankruptcy/609169/ [https://perma.cc/Z664-ERVP] (discussing 
how the coronavirus has impacted municipal budgets nationwide).  
284 This phenomenon of shrinking infrastructure is often referred to as “right-sizing.” 
GAO-16-785, WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 25, at 22, 35; see also Faust et al., supra 
note 25, at 7. For specific examples of now defunct manufacturing needs, see Highsmith, 
Beyond Corporate Abandonment, supra note 109, at 35. 
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employing residents.285 As manufacturing facilities were closed or relocated, their 
financial contributions to the city disappeared.286 However, the pipes, water mains, 
and other physical infrastructure, designed to specifically accommodate the needs 
of industrial customers, remained part of the city’s water system.287 The city was 
suddenly responsible for maintaining this vast, complex infrastructure designed not 
only to accommodate a larger population, but also meet the needs of significant 
corporate manufacturing interests. Moreover, this infrastructure had degraded over 
time as fiscal resources continued to be compressed by structural forces that spurred 
economic disenfranchisement.288  
Of course, this phenomenon was not limited to the industrial Midwest. Small 
towns across Appalachia also experienced the same combination of significant 
population loss and corporate dominance,289 resulting in comparable negative 
impacts on rural drinking water systems. Water prices became more expensive per 
capita; municipal governments struggled to improve infrastructure intended to serve 
corporate needs without the benefit of corporate income.  
GDS are ill-equipped to maintain or repair water infrastructure because of their 
financial circumstances, resulting from decades of disinvestment. One study found 
that GDS are the poorest places in a state, lagging behind other municipalities of 
similar size in individual income and economic growth.290 The solution has been to 
implement austerity measures, cutting services and staffing, which only accelerates 
the degradation of infrastructure and leads to even greater disrepair.291 This, in turn, 
 
285 Hammer, supra note 82, at 126; HIGHSMITH, supra note 60, at 130. 
286 Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1133–34 
(2014). 
287 Faust et al., supra note 25, at 1–2. 
288 Id. 
289 Although the total number of municipal residents was always small in places like 
West Virginia due to geography and the boom and bust cycles created by extractive 
industries, Appalachian towns did experience significant population loss as the coal industry 
declined in the region. For example, Keystone declined from 2,594 residents in 1950 to only 
474 in 2000, and then decreased an additional 40% to 282 by 2010. See U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, Census of Population: 1950, at 48–10 (1953), https://www2.census.gov/library/ 
publications/decennial/1950/population-volume-1/vol-01-51.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ4J-
3NRT]; Keystone, West Virginia Population: Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive Map, 
Demographics, Statistics, and Quick Facts, CENSUS VIEWER http://censusviewer.com/city/ 
WV/Keystone [https://perma.cc/Q5SK-KKN5] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020); see also Faust et 
al., supra note 25, at 25 (“[S]mall cities and towns throughout the United States are facing a 
multitude of issues related to urban decline that may be similar.”). 
290 Faust et al., supra note 25, at 4–5. 
291 See Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, Police Funding, 72 FLA. L. REV. 277, 277 
(2020) (“Much of this variation exists because police departments derive funding primarily 
from local sales and property taxes. Because of this funding mechanism, economically 
disadvantaged communities most in need of public-safety services can often least afford 
them.”). Scalar dumping—passing financial responsibility for various public goods onto 
state and local governments—often leads to austerity measures. Jaime Peck, Austerity 
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leads to even more population loss, further reducing the already limited tax base and 
other revenue streams.292  
GDS need to transform their existing systems rather than repair them. They 
must build sustainable models that comport with their smaller populations and 
economic realities. This requires an infusion of cash resources and technical 
assistance to redesign their outdated and dilapidated systems—sometimes referred 
to as “right-sizing.”293 And yet, this is extremely difficult to achieve under the 
existing funding regime. As detailed in Part II, funding sources are limited and the 
total amounts allocated by federal and state governments have been steadily 
decreasing. Moreover, GDS are often unable to successfully compete for funding 
due to structural barriers involving their fiscal situations, managerial capacity, and 
project needs.294  
 
II.  FUNDING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
For communities like Flint, Gary, and Keystone, securing capital to repair 
degrading infrastructure and maintain operations is an ongoing struggle. The very 
fact that GDS find themselves in this funding predicament is indicative of a serious 
structural problem resulting from continuous financial divestment. Drinking water 
systems were never intended to be financial burdens for localities, but an important 
asset that can serve as a municipal revenue source.295 At a minimum, systems were 
 
Urbanism: American Cities Under Extreme Economy, 16 CITY: ANALYSIS OF URB. CHANGE, 
THEORY, ACTION 626 (2012); Wilde Anderson, supra note 286, at 1120–21 (noting austerity 
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293 See JOHN HOORNBEEK & TERRY SCHWARZ, SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IN 
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294 The majority of state and federal funds are awarded through a competitive loan and 
grant application process. For a more complete discussion of GDS and relevant barriers, see 
infra Section II.C. 
295 In actuality, the costs of operating water systems within GDS far outweigh the 
revenues, making it impossible for the system to operate in a sustainable manner. The water 
system is forced to make untenable choices to save money, leading to further degradation of 
aging infrastructure and exposing residents to water-related health and economic 
consequences. See discussion supra Sections II.B–C; see also BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., 
supra note 282, at 16 (noting “many utilities, while mostly able to recover their operating 
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designed to be financially self-sustaining, with the fees from rate-payers covering 
standard operating costs, maintenance expenses, and capital improvements.296 
Capital improvements refer to upgrades to existing infrastructure, like water mains, 
reservoirs, or treatment facilities, and include new construction and technology, like 
investing in green infrastructure or expanding pipes to new neighborhoods. Water 
systems rely primarily on debt-based financing, which can prove problematic for 
communities in fiscal distress. GDS invariably carry significant existing debts with 
limited revenue streams, and thus struggle to secure infrastructure funding through 
the existing mechanisms. 
 
A.  Traditional Funding and Financing Mechanisms 
 
A drinking water system, if operating as envisioned and designed, should be 
able to cover the costs of any upgrades or new construction through its own reserve 
funds.297 Water bills typically include a charge for a capital improvement or other 
reserve funds—essentially “rainy day” savings held for the express purpose of 
covering the costs of future projects.298 Water systems can engage in self-financing 
infrastructure projects by drawing from reserve funds or raising water rates charged 
to customers to increase revenue, allocating these new funds to capital projects.299  
If a system lacks sufficient monies to fund the project through reserve funds or 
raising rates, it can turn to financing options.300 State and local governments 
commonly turn to municipal bonds to finance a variety of projects, including water 
systems.301 Municipal bonds are a form of debt sold directly by a local government 
to the public or institutional investors.302 The investor receives interest payments and 
 
risks will shift from today’s customers to tomorrow’s, deferring needed Investments and 
threatening the intergenerational equity, and increase the possibility of a system failure.”). 
296 Faust et al., supra note 25, at 4; see also Pricing and Affordability of Water Services, 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-water-infrastructure/pricing-and-affordability-water 
-services [https://perma.cc/765B-JT8S] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (“User fees typically 
generate funds for daily operation and maintenance and long-term capital investments for 
drinking water and wastewater systems.”). 
297 Andy McCartney, Cash Reserves Pt. 2: Capital Reserves, Debt Service & Rate 
Stabilization Reserves, WATER FIN. & MGMT (Apr. 8, 2019), https://waterfm.com/cash-
reserves-pt-2-capital-reserves-debt-service-rate-stabilization-reserves/ [https://perma.cc/W 
H8T-HJDH]. 
298 Cash Reserve Policy Guidelines, AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 6–7 (2018), 
https://www.awwa.org/Portals/0/AWWA/ETS/Resources/awwacashreservepolicynew.pdf?
ver=2018-12-17-161414-370 [https://perma.cc/9K3S-QG4A]. 
299 GAO-16-785, WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 25, at 2. 
300 For purposes of this Article, funding refers to covering operating expenses and 
capital improvements through rates and existing reserve funds. In contrast, financing refers 
to seeking outside debt-servicing like loans, municipal bonds, etc.  
301 JASON HACKWORTH, THE NEOLIBERAL CITY: GOVERNANCE, IDEOLOGY, AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN URBANISM 20 (2007). 
302 The State of State (and Local) Tax Policy, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicy 
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repayment of the principle over a fixed period of time. Municipal bonds are 
generally exempt from federal income tax.303 By issuing bonds, the system raises 
funds for the new project and slowly pays back the bonds over time. Increasingly, 
some state and local governments are also using bank loans to finance certain 
municipal projects as well.304  
Unfortunately, these funding options are often foreclosed to GDS. Water 
systems often struggle to cover their general operating costs with revenue from 
customers, leaving little money—if any—for the capital improvement reserve funds, 
which typically cover the costs of infrastructure projects.305 Moreover, the required 
redevelopment and upgrades are a massive financial undertaking due to decades of 
minimal investment.306 For places like Flint and McDowell County, decades of 
divestment have left them insolvent, unable to afford basic municipal services, let 
alone major redevelopment projects.  
Raising rates to generate additional revenue for capital improvements also 
presents significant challenges. Water systems within GDS are reluctant to raise 
rates out of concern for customers. They know increased costs may be an undue 
burden for the shrinking, economically disenfranchised communities they serve.307 
Furthermore, many water systems struggle to collect payment on existing water 
bills; thus, raising rates would only push more customers into late payment or 
nonpayment.308 In addition to these practical considerations, there are political 
elements to rate increases that make them difficult to execute. In some jurisdictions, 
like Wisconsin, approval from elected officials may be required to implement a rate 
increase. Local politicians are rarely eager to endorse rate increases that increase 
financial burdens for their constituents. Even if direct approval is not required, local 
politics are aware of the economic fallout from rate increases. Rising rates can 
 
center.org/briefing-book/what-are-municipal-bonds-and-how-are-they-used [https://perma. 
cc/J2YY-AWZZ] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020). 
303 Note that municipal bonds can also be exempt from state income taxes in certain 
situations, depending on the residency of the purchaser. U.S. SEC, SEC Pub No. 134, 
MUNICIPAL BONDS: UNDERSTANDING CREDIT RISK 1 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/investor 
/alerts/municipalbondsbulletin.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VHF-A27M]. 
304 Robert Puentes & Patrick Sabol, Building Better Infrastructure with Better Bonds, 
BROOKINGS (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/building-better-
infrastructure-with-better-bonds/ [https://perma.cc/SU3V-KY7B]. 
305 BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 282, at 16. Interview with Jenny Newland, 
Expert, Downstream Water & Wastewater, in W. Va. (Jan. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Jenny 
Newland Interview]. 
306 CLARK, supra note 59, at 35–36 (noting that Flint residents experienced some of the 
highest water bills because the infrastructure and operations costs were distributed over a 
smaller population). 
307 Jenny Newland Interview, supra note 305. 
308 See Dan Kraker, Old Pipes, Rising Rates: Duluth and Other Cities Invest in Water 
Infrastructure, MPR NEWS (Feb. 8, 2019, 11:14 PM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019 
/02/08/duluth-and-other-cities-invest-in-water-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/B3CC-
RBX6]. 
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encourage residents to relocate to more affordable, neighboring towns.309 GDS also 
find it difficult to raise funds through municipal bonds, the most ubiquitous form of 
municipal financing.  
Generally, bonds have a credit rating—an evaluation of the risk associated with 
the investment.310 The better the credit rating, the more likely investors are to 
purchase the bonds.311 Many GDS are unable to secure a favorable credit rating for 
potential projects, making it difficult to use bond financing.312 One such recent 
example is the City of Newark, New Jersey. The city was rocked by its own lead 
poisoning crisis in 2019 and faced challenges in acquiring sufficient capital through 
municipal bonds due to its low rating.313 Fortunately, the surrounding Essex 
County—the richest county in New Jersey, entered into an arrangement to “lend” its 
high rating to the City to assist in securing necessary funding.314  
 
309 CLARK, supra note 59, at 35 (quoting an administrative superintendent of the 
neighboring community of Beecher as stating, “I hope people read this article about high 
water rates in Flint and move to Beecher . . . . We’re the cheapest around.”); see also Wilde 
Anderson, supra note 286, at 1210 (“Such vacancies create a downward spiral of local 
disinvestment and abandonment, as falling quality of life and housing values push the most 
mobile residents to exit and leave behind an increasingly poor population.”). 
310 The Importance of Municipal Bond Ratings, GMS GROUP, https://www.gmsgroup. 
com/muni-bond-ratings-standard-and-poors [https://perma.cc/X9SC-3A9J] (last visited Oct. 
13, 2020). 
311 HACKWORTH, supra note 301, at 21–22, 33. 
312 In fact, the EPA actually uses “low credit score/bond rating” as one indicator of a 
“community in need”—a financially insecure community that will need extra funding for 
capital improvement projects. Jeff Hughes, Richard Whisnant, Lynn Weller, Shadi Eskaf, 
Matthew Richardson, Scott Morrissey & Ben Altz-Stamm, Drinking Water and Wastewater 
Infrastructure in Appalachia, An Analysis of Captial Funding and Funding Caps, 
APPALACHIAN REG. COMM’N & UNC ENV’T FIN. CEN., ARC & UNC (July 2005), 
https://efc.sog.unc.edu/sites/default/files/2017/Executive%20Summary%20Drinking%20W
ater%20and%20Wastewater%20in%20Appalachia.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY3A-DM4H] 
(“Relatively few communities in Appalachia, especially in economically distressed counties, 
have credit ratings for water and wastewater purposes from major rating agencies. This lack 
of creditworthiness limits their direct access to the private capital market.”); see also U.S. 
EPA, TOOLS FOR FINANCING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE 48 (Mar. 2007), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-01/documents/waterinfra2007.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M4VQ-6TVK]. 
313 Corasaniti, supra note 14. 
314 George N. Saliba, $120M Bond Aims to Fix Newark’s Lead Water, N.J. BUS. (Aug. 
26, 2019), https://njbmagazine.com/njb-news-now/120m-loan-aims-to-fix-newarks-lead-
water/ [https://perma.cc/7MQY-V3JV] (noting the role of the Essex County Bond Rating in 
securing assistance for Newark); see also Vanessa Romo, Flood of Money Could Fast-Track 
Newark’s Plan to Replace Lead Pipes Amid Water Crisis, NPR (Aug. 26, 2019, 8:02 PM) 
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/26/754537989/flood-of-money-could-fast-track-newarks-plan 
-to-replace-lead-pipes-amid-water-cr [https://perma.cc/277Y-JB7Q] (explaining that the 
previous plan placed burden on Newark homeowners, but the new plan will save Newark 
years and “upwards of $15 to $20 million in interest over the life of the bond.”). 
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It is important to note that these strategies—self-financing and municipal 
bonds—do not exist in silos. Bond issuances are often accompanied by rate 
increases, with the new revenues covering the principal and interest payments for 
bondholders.315 Thus, issuing bonds can further accelerate affordability concerns for 
GDS communities, forcing water systems to make a difficult choice between making 
much needed infrastructure investments and maintaining affordability for 
residents.316 When self-financing or municipal bonds are inadequate, localities can 
also pursue federal and state funds specifically allocated for water infrastructure 
projects. As discussed in the next section, these funding sources are limited and may 
still prove inaccessible for GDS.  
 
B.  Federal and State Funding Sources 
 
A number of federal agencies provide grants or low-interest loans for water and 
wastewater infrastructure, although this number is still far less than the demand. The 
total amount of funding from federal sources has steadily decreased, creating an 
enormous funding gap, and the focus of much concern from environmental activists, 
representatives from municipal and state governments, civil engineers, the GAO, the 
EPA, and even moderate policy groups like the AARP.317 The predominant state and 
federal funding sources are discussed in greater detail below.  
 
1.  EPA and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds 
 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides the largest source of 
funding for drinking water infrastructure projects.318 The majority of the funds are 
administered through the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF), a 
partnership between the Federal Government, all 50 states, and Puerto Rico, 
established via a 1996 amendment to the Safe Drinking Water Act.319 Under the 
 
315 See generally Carol Thompson, Struggling Lehigh County Authority Eyes Raising 
Allentown Rates as a Large Bond Payment Looms, THE MORNING CALL (Apr. 27, 2018, 9:50 
PM) https://www.mcall.com/news/local/mc-nws-lca-debt-warning-20180423-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/X5TQ-77VE]. 
316 GAO-16-785, WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 25, at 29. 
317 See generally U.S. EPA, DRINKING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS SURVEY AND 
ASSESSMENT: SIXTH REPORT TO CONGRESS (Mar. 2018); AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, 2021 
INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD: DRINKING WATER (2021), https://infrastructurereportcard. 
org/cat-item/drinking-water/ [https://perma.cc/7T5H-Q23K]; see also NEIL WALTERS, 
REPLACING THE NATION’S DETERIORATING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE WHILE MAINTAINING 
AFFORDABLE WATER RATES, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. REPORT (2011) 
https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/cons_prot/2011/in
sight56.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TXW-48ME]; Danny Vinik, Is Washington Creating More 
Flints?, POLITICO (May 25, 2016) https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/05/water-
funding-washington-flint-000128 [https://perma.cc/ET2P-6SGB]. 
318 TIEMANN, supra note 29, at 1. 
319 The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, §1452, 
110 Stat. 1613 (1996); 42 U.S.C. §300j-12 (2019). 
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DWSRF, the EPA is allocated funds to distribute to each state annually for water 
infrastructure improvement projects.320 Each individual state is responsible for 
contributing a 20% match for the amount awarded by the EPA.321 The combined 
money from the EPA and state matching funds, minus any set-asides instituted by 
state governments, is then pooled into the state’s “Drinking Water Revolving Loan 
Fund” or the State Revolving Fund (SRF).322  
Each state is responsible for managing and operating its SRF, which typically 
distributes the money as low-interest loans.323 The SRF really operates as a financing 
portfolio for the entire state. Various public water systems324 apply for financing 
from the SRF for eligible projects limited in scope.325 As projects begin repaying the 
loans, this money can then be used to secure future financing for other water 
infrastructure projects in the state.326 It is vital that state officials carefully monitor, 
evaluate, and balance their SRF lending portfolio.327 Poor management and risky 
lending could prove financially dangerous for the revolving fund as a whole, 
undermining its sustainability.  
  
 
320 Eligible projects under DWSRF include water treatment, transmission and 
distribution, source, storage, consolidation, and creation of new systems. See DWSRF, supra 
note 29. 
321 The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §300j-12. 
322 TIEMANN, supra note 29, at 2–4. 
323 The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §300j-12. 
324 Generally, only public water systems are eligible for the funding. 
325 TIEMANN, supra note 29, at 1 (“Projects eligible for DWSRF assistance include 
installation and replacement of treatment facilities, distribution systems, and certain storage 
facilities. Projects to replace aging infrastructure are eligible if they are needed to maintain 
compliance or to further health protection goals. Projects to consolidate water supplies and 
enhance water system security may also be eligible. DWSRF funds may be used for 
preconstruction activities. They may not be used to pay for operation and maintenance 
activities or for projects needed primarily to accommodate growth.”). 
326 See U.S. EPA, HOW THE DRINKING WATER STATE REVOLVING FUND WORKS, 
https://www.epa.gov/dwsrf/how-drinking-water-state-revolving-fund-works [https://perma 
.cc/4DEE-EYSJ] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020). 
327 U.S. EPA, SRF FUND MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 12–14 (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-04/documents/fund_management_handbo 
ok_2018final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5NP-SA2]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-
15-567, STATE REVOLVING FUNDS: IMPROVED FINANCIAL INDICATORS COULD STRENGTHEN 
EPA OVERSIGHT (2015) (explaining that the SRF is meant to be sustainable through a return 
on investments and that states should carefully monitor and balance their return on 
investments). 
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2.  USDA—Rural Water Development 
 
The USDA provides funding for water infrastructure to rural communities 
through the Rural Utilities Services (RUS) program.328 To qualify for funding, 
communities must meet particular population and income requirements. Eligible 
communities must have populations of 10,000 or less and show economic need, 
qualifying as low income and lacking sufficient credit to secure loans through 
traditional lending.329 In previous years, the majority of RUS funding, approximately 
75%, was distributed through direct loans or guarantees of third-party loans.330 The 
interest rate on the loans is set based on the economic health of the community, 
though all loans must be repaid within 40 years.331  
The RUS also provides a limited number of grants to communities. Generally, 
these funds are only available to prevent exorbitant rate increases per capita for 
poverty and intermediate rate income communities.332 Additionally, these 
communities need to demonstrate some stability in terms of population loss, 
ensuring the drinking water infrastructure will serve the intended population when 
constructed, rather than being built only to find itself rapidly depopulated and 
ineffectual.333 Like so many other sources of infrastructure funding, the demand far 
outstrips the capacity. In 2016, USDA reported a $2.5 billion backlog of requests 
for both water and wastewater projects.334  
 
3.  HUD—Community Development Block Grants 
 
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administers 
assistance for community and economic development activities to state and local 
governments through the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. 
The program’s primary objective is “to develop viable communities by providing 
decent housing and a suitable living environment, and by expanding economic 
 
328 Water and Environmental Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.rd.usda. 
gov/programs-services/all-programs/water-environmental-programs [https://perma.cc/9NV 
H-S2LV] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020). 
329 JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, ANNA E. NORMAND, EUGENE BOYD, CHARLES V. STERN, 
TADLOCK COWAN, MEGAN STUBBS, ELENA H. HUMPHREYS & MARY TIENANN, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., RL30478, FEDERALLY SUPPORTED WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT 
PROGRAMS 18 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30478.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8NU-
A3PU]. 
330 Id. at 16 (“The split between loans and grants distributed from the regular 
infrastructure program, which is the large majority of spending, was about 75-25 in 2015 and 
2016.32 There is no statutory distribution formula.”). 
331 Id. 
332 Water & Waste Disposal Loan & Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
https://www.rd.usda.gov/programs-services/water-waste-disposal-loan-grant-program 
[https://perma.cc/25ZV-U34Y] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020).  
333 See RAMSEUR ET AL., supra note 329, at 17. 
334 Id. at 16. 
2021] THIRSTY PLACES 551 
 
opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate income.”335 The CDBG 
funds are very flexible and can be used for a variety of economic development 
projects, including water infrastructure.336 Unfortunately, this same flexibility means 
this funding is not dedicated to water projects. These proposals must compete with 
other proposals, including building affordable housing, reviving commercial 
corridors, improving high-speed internet access, and a variety of other economic 
development projects.337  
 
4.  Department of Commerce—PWED 
 
The Department of Commerce operates a Public Works and Economic 
Development Facilities (PWED) program through the Economic Development 
Administration. PWED funds revitalization, expansion, and upgrades of water and 
wastewater infrastructure.338 The projects must be connected to improving and 
diversifying the local economy, including attracting new industries or encouraging 
business retention or expansion.339 Grants are awarded directly to eligible applicants, 
but generally cannot exceed 50% of the total project cost.340 Additional funding for 
the project must be procured from elsewhere. Recent budget cuts to the EDA have 
also impacted the PWED, with no new appropriations made to program for 2020.341 
 
C.  GDS Competitive Disadvantage 
 
Section II.B. outlines the limited and ever-shrinking pool of funding for water 
infrastructure projects. However, even when such funding may be available, many 
GDS find it difficult to access these resources.342  
As an initial barrier, GDS are often unable to pursue the predominant debt-
based funding opportunities due to fiscal and managerial constraints. Water 
problems within GDS are persistent and develop continuously throughout the years. 
At various junctures, the local government or water system worked to address the 
worst problems by applying for funding—generally loans—to pay for necessary 
 
335 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c). 
336 GAO-16-785, WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 25, at 11, 37. 
337 Community Development Block Grant Program—CDBG, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & 
URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelopme 
nt/programs [https://perma.cc/SQ9L-CWY8] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020). 
338 RAMSEUR ET AL., supra note 329, at 40–41. 
339 Id. 
340 42 U.S.C § 3144. 
341 See Alexia Fernández Campbell, Trump’s Budget Proposal Hurts the Rust Belt 
Factory Towns that Voted for Him, VOX (Feb. 13, 2018, 2:50 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/2/13/17004590/trump-budget-cuts-manufacturing-michigan-
west-virginia [https://perma.cc/GMJ6-YQL3]. 
342 Pannu, supra note 44 (noting that only ten percent of funds in 2009 were set aside 
to assist disadvantaged communities, and this despite the state’s commitment to recognizing 
water as a fundamental right for residents.). 
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renovations or upgrades.343 Community systems are still clearing debts from prior 
capital improvement projects when new problems arise.344 Localities are forced to 
determine whether they can shoulder new debt from SRF loans or other sources to 
address these present-day issues.345 As a reminder, the main form of revenue for a 
water system is payments from customers. These funds must cover existing debts 
and standard operating expenses; thus, adding a new loan could stretch the system 
beyond its financial limits.346 Localities are, understandably, cautioned by financial 
auditors and accountants that the additional debt may be impossible or ruinous, 
discouraging them from pursuing federal and state funding.347 
Even when GDS are able to shoulder additional debt, these communities often 
encounter challenges during the application process. Grant and loan applications for 
water system funding sources are incredibly thorough and no small undertaking.348 
Most require a number of supporting documents, including engineering studies 
outlining the design and technical specifications, financial audits attesting to the 
 
343 Will Wright, Caity Coyne & Molly Born, Why Many in Central Appalachia Lack 
Reliable, Clean Water, GROUNDTRUTH PROJ. (Dec. 16, 2018), https://thegroundtruthproject. 
org/stirring_the_waters_appalachia/ [https://perma.cc/5GPK-6KMP] (“Today, low-interest 
loans are being utilized more and more, but even when they are low-interest, the debt can 
handicap small water systems” and “[t]he only real source of revenue for community water 
systems is by collecting bills from customers. As more and more people leave West Virginia 
and Eastern Kentucky—in the last 10 years, West Virginia is one of two states that have lost 
population nationally—water systems willare going to have less and less revenue.”). 
344 Caity Coyne, ‘Who’s Going to Pay for It?’: No Easy Answers to Resolve Water 
Issues, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/report 
_for_america/whos-going-to-pay-for-it-no-easy-answers-to-resolve-water-issues/article_c9 
a01e2d-54f1-58f4-92ac-1dfed33b1634.html [https://perma.cc/VE98-G7GF]; Jenny 
Newland Interview, supra note 305. 
345 Jackie Whetzel, When the Water Runs Dry (with Video), REGISTER-HERALD (Feb. 
1, 2020), https://www.register-herald.com/news/when-the-water-runs-dry-with-video/artic 
le_3a4aa280-ef0d-57ae-a032-d5223c44f15c.html [https://perma.cc/JQ3A-6HEX] (noting 
that the local Public Service District simply cannot accrue additional debt to make much 
needed upgrades and repairs; “[w]e have no way of paying loans with our current situation.”).  
346 See JEFF HUGHES, MAUREEN BERNER, AUSTIN THOMPSON, LEIGH-ANNE KROMETIS, 
TIFFANY DRAPE, SHADI ESKAF, JULIA CAVALIER, GRANT MCMILLAN & ETHAN SMITH, AN 
EVALUATION OF APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION FUNDING OF DRINKING WATER AND 





347 Jenny Newland Interview, supra note 305. 
348 See generally DRINKING WATER STATE REVOLVING FUND 2022 PROJECT 
CONSTRUCTION EVALUATION FORM: INSTRUCTIONS AND GUDIANCE, COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENV’T AFFS., DEP’T OF ENV’T PROT. (2021), 
https://www.srfmadep.com/state-revolving-fund-applications-forms/dw/dwpef.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/N4Q7-YTM4] (demonstrating the level of detail and required supplemental studies 
and documentation). 
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sustainability of the project, and sometimes even legal opinions involving land use 
issues.349 Many successful applications are written by professional grant writers, 
individuals with a proven track record of securing funding and managing the 
application process.350 The fiscal situation for many GDS is too precarious to 
allocate extra funds for hiring the necessary technical experts (lawyers, engineers, 
etc.) or professional grant writers.351 These communities also lack the manpower to 
manage a large project, as city services and personnel have been whittled away as 
part of austerity measures.352  
Water systems routinely hire engineering firms to navigate and assemble an 
application for federal and state funding sources.353 The engineering firms prepare 
the application as part of their role as contractors for the project, meaning only those 
projects likely to generate adequate revenue receive attention and priority from the 
private firms.354 Another option is relying on state agencies for assistance, but these 
services vary wildly across jurisdictions. For example, West Virginia has no 
dedicated agency or department aiding communities in drafting applications for 
water infrastructure funding.355  
 
349 Jenny Newland Interview, supra note 305 (describing the application process and 
barriers for small communities in West Virginia); see also DWSRF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
APPLICATION BEFORE YOU START, CAL. WATER BDS., https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/drin 
king_water/services/funding/documents/srf/dw_before_you_start.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H 
EA-2PYQ] (listing required supplemental materials including a legal opinion, environmental 
report (“environmental package”), and financing and budget report (“financial security 
packages”)). 
350 Jenny Newland Interview, supra note 305; Interview with Katherine Garvey, 
Professor and Dir. of the Land Use & Sustainable Dev. Clinic at W. Va. Univ. Coll. of L. 
(Feb. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Katherine Garvey Interview]. 
351 See generally TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (TA) FUNDING PROGRAM, CAL. WATER 
BOARDS STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD. https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/ 
programs/grants_loans/tech_asst_funding.html [https://perma.cc/NTB7-2F8K] (last visited 
May 18, 2021) (showing that some states, like California, provide specialized technical 
assistance for GDS communities applying for such grants). 
352 See Caity Coyne, O’Toole Residents Could Have Clean Water for First Time in 16 
Years, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/new 
s/o-toole-residents-could-have-clean-water-for-first-time/article_1512ae51-9bbd-5693-9a2 
1-c56618a4a927.html [https://perma.cc/2GUT-HXJ5]; see also Coyne, In Southern W.Va., 
supra note 171. 
353 See generally COLORADO’S STATE REVOLVING FUND LOAN PROGRAM 
ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING SERVICES PROCUREMENT, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. 
HEALTH & ENV’T,  https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/SRF-AE-
Procurement-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW97-NJ5V] (last visited May 18, 2021) 
(describing the recommended bidding process for SRFs); MINGO COUNTY PSD REGIONAL 
WATER SYSTEM, THRASHER GROUP, https://thethrashergroup.com/portfolio-item/mingo-
county-psd-regional-water-system/ [https://perma.cc/9BGJ-MF4E] (last visited May 18, 
2021) (listing the plan and construction services provided by a private firm). 
354 Katherine Garvey Interview, supra note 350. 
355 Id. Communities can seek assistance from other resources including the Land Use 
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Funding applications from GDS often paint a grim portrait. Engineering reports 
and accounting audits attached to loan and grant applications indicate to funders that 
these localities may not have the financial and staffing resources to implement a 
project.356 Additionally, these reports also list the number of households and 
customers, documenting the small and declining populations. As noted by one expert 
in West Virginia, the shrinking population makes it less likely for “decision-makers 
to commit loan dollars and make lenders leery of sending loan dollars to places like 
that (Wyoming County) where you may or may not get repayment.”357 
The situation is further exacerbated by a mismatch between the funding 
priorities of programs like the SRF and the needs of GDS. SRFs “prioritize projects 
that address Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean Water Act compliance issues, such 
as acute violations of drinking water standards or health advisory levels.”358 In 
contrast, GDS often need funds for long-term planning and “right-sizing” assistance, 
which may include significant infrastructure investments.359 The reduction in federal 
funding allocations can also work to the detriment of GDS. The infrastructure needs 
of a major metropolitan area can easily require the lion’s share of a state’s annual 
funding.360 If the funding request is to address acute issues related to compliance, 
such a project is likely to receive priory, leaving smaller GDS with no funds and no 
options.  
Although these factors may not disqualify GDS from receiving funding, 
collectively, they make for a less competitive application. Perhaps most troubling, 
GDS are once again—at least in operation—deemed risky investments. GDS are 
effectively excluded from accessing government funding for critical infrastructure, 
leaving vulnerable communities without water.  
  
 
and Sustainable Development Clinic at West Virginia University, the Rural Water 
Association, certain planning commissions, or the Development Office within the West 
Virginia Department of Commerce. However, these groups have limited staffing and are also 
responsible for a plethora of other projects ranging from affordable housing to broadband 
infrastructure development. See also What Is the Capacity Development Program, W. VA. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. RES., http://www.wvdhhr.org/oehs/eed/iandcd/capdevinfo.asp 
[https://perma.cc/AY5L-E49K] (last visited May 18, 2021) (noting the absence of grant 
drafting help). 
356 Jenny Newland Interview, supra note 305. 
357 Whetzel, supra note 345. 
358 GAO-16-785, WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 25, at 43. 
359 See HOORNBEEK & SCHWARZ, supra note 293; Faust et al., supra note 25, at 4; 
SMART GROWTH PROGRAM, supra note 93. 
360 Snider, supra note 80. 
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D.  Misdiagnosing the Crisis 
 
Imagining a community without running water in a wealthy, industrialized 
nation seems ludicrous. The uncomfortable truth is that water injustice is all too 
common in the United States, with GDS at the epicenter of the crisis.361 
Infrastructure is both an indicator of a community’s economic health and an 
important element in maintaining economic vitality. A community ill-equipped to 
maintain a functional drinking water system, considered crucial infrastructure, is 
essentially broadcasting its financial failure. You cannot hope to build and maintain 
a vibrant community without reliable, potable water. No business is interested in 
staying, let alone expanding, when drinking water is unreliable. Few residents will 
want to remain if potable water is not accessible. Even those who do wish to stay 
may find themselves hard-pressed if businesses and employers leave for other, safer, 
and more stable places.362  
Federal and state funding dedicated to drinking water systems is predicated on 
the assumption that such systems are an asset for local governments and are capable 
of self-sufficiency—if not a significant source of revenue generation.363 However, 
this belief in no way reflects the grim reality of many struggling water systems. 
Increasingly, reports are finding that the United States has many smaller systems 
that are not fiscally viable.364 Functional systems must cover routine operations and 
maintenance, but also proactively replace aging infrastructure. These smaller 
systems simply cannot afford necessary capital investments, and by forgoing 
 
361 See Katie Forcade, Keystone Residents Left Without Water Due to Broken Pipe, 
WVNS-TV (June 3, 2019, 5:44 PM), https://www.wvnstv.com/news/west-virginia-
news/mcdowell-county/keystone-residents-left-without-water-due-to-broken-pipe/ [https:// 
perma.cc/S8U5-2GSZ] (discussing the impact living without water has had on Keystone 
resident Ed Todd as he struggles to take care of his sick wife: “My wife can’t get upstairs to 
a restroom. We have to keep her clean with just wipes. That’s the hard part of this is taking 
care of my wife.”).  
362 Pannu, supra note 44, at 235. 
363 Faust et al., supra note 25, at 4. 
364 See U.S. EPA, PROVIDING SAFE DRINKING WATER IN AMERICA 5 (2012) 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-07/documents/sdwacom2012.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/UE3T-GR8Z] (“This disparity is often the result of differences in financial, 
administrative, and technical capacity between large and small systems. Small PWSs have a 
smaller customer base to support purchase and installation of needed infrastructure and to 
operate and maintain the system. Similarly, small PWSs may be unable or unwilling to 
charge consumers rates sufficient to cover the true cost of collecting, treating, and 
distributing the water. Lack of funding may cause small PWSs to delay needed capital 
improvements. Small PWSs (particularly non-community water systems) are often overseen 
by part-time administrators who are not environmental professionals, and the pay for the 
system operators may not be adequate to attract and keep someone with the necessary 
training and skills. If there are violations, small PWSs may not have the technical capabilities 
to correct the underlying problems.”). 
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proactive replacement, the systems fall into disrepair, which is only exacerbated 
over time.365  
The cure for the infrastructure crisis in GDS is not as simple as increasing 
available funds for water systems. Increasing allocations to existing funding sources 
serves only to treat the symptom and completely ignores the underlying illness—
economic disenfranchisement. GDS are unable to repair and maintain their water 
systems because of consistent disinvestment, often compounded over time, which 
concentrated poverty within specific geographic boundaries. The true remedy for the 
infrastructure crisis in GDS is an economic one, an opportunity to create a 
comprehensive plan to build a sustainable future for these forgotten places and invest 
in them accordingly. 
 
III.  THE GREEN NEW DEAL 
 
“[W]e’ve been pouring money into Appalachia since the Roosevelt 
administration. At what point do we say, we’ve done what we can?”  
—Peter Morici366 
 
The epicenter of American infrastructure crises manifests in GDS, heavily 
impacting marginalized communities trapped in lengthy and pernicious cycles of 
economic abandonment and financial distress. The existing infrastructure funding 
system fails to reflect the economic realities of GDS, providing only temporary 
solutions to physical infrastructure without addressing the underlying structural 
problems. As the drinking water crises within GDS are symptoms of economic 
disenfranchisement, any purported solution must include significant economic 
transition planning and reinvestment. Thus, “we have done what we can” only when 
we commit to pursuing a just economic transition for Appalachia and other GDS. 
One potentially promising policy proposal is “The Green New Deal”—a 
resolution introduced by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez as a means of 
economic reinvestment and infrastructure development, with particular emphasis on 
targeting marginalized communities, like GDS.367 The resolutions outlined five 
primary goals:  
 
365 See generally Coyne, In Southern W.Va., supra note 171 (noting the challenges of 
raising capital for repairs and the damage to overuse of existing equipment in rural areas); 
see also Whetzel, supra note 345.  
366 Morning Edition, Two Economists with Opposing Political Views on the Trump 
Budget, NPR, at 02:17 (Mar. 17, 2017, 4:49 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/17/520498 
604/two-economists-with-opposing-political-views-on-the-trump-budget [https://perma.cc/ 
LV9M-6VRC] (quoting leading conservative economist Pete Morici). 
367 Kelly Stone, Green New Deal: What It Is and What It Isn’t, ACTIONAID (Mar. 26, 
2019), https://www.actionaidusa.org/blog/green-new-deal-what-it-is-and-what-it-isnt/ 
[https://perma.cc/A8J6-YD5J]; H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Thomas L. 
Friedman, A Warning from the Garden, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/opinion/19friedman.html?module=inline [https://per 
ma.cc/Q7SD-4RQW] (detailing an earlier proposal recommended by conservative thinkers). 
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(A) Achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just 
transition for all communities and workers; 
 
(B) Create millions of good, high-wage jobs and ensure prosperity and 
economic security for all people of the United States; 
 
(C) Invest in the infrastructure and industry of the United States to 
sustainably meet the challenges of the twenty-first century; 
 
(D) Secure for all people of the United States for generations to come: 
clean air and water, climate and community resiliency; healthy food; 
access to nature; and a sustainable environment; and 
 
(E) Promote justice and equity by stopping current, preventing future, 
and repairing historic oppression of indigenous peoples, communities of 
color, migrant communities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated 
rural communities, the poor, low-income workers, women, the elderly, the 
unhoused, people with disabilities, and youth (“frontline and vulnerable 
communities”).368 
 
Often the Green New Deal is framed as a primarily environmental initiative 
with elements of workforce development.369 Unfortunately, the emphasis on 
decarbonization and job training captures only a portion of the Green New Deal’s 
intended aims, ignoring the important economic and justice mandates.370 The Green 
New Deal resolution explicitly references the current plight of “front-line and 
vulnerable communities.”371 Moreover, in recognizing the disparate impact and 
historical forces, the proposal opens the door for collaborative and inclusive policy 
solutions prioritizing GDS. Thus, scholars and activists have supported either a 
 
368 H.R. 109, 116th Cong. (2019). 
369 See generally William Cummings, Sen. Tom Cotton Blasts ‘Stalin-like’ Coverup of 
Ocasio-Cortez’s Green New Deal FAQ, USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2019, 11:16 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2019/02/13/green-new-deal-critic 
ism/2856874002/ [https://perma.cc/C9VL-TUKY]; Lisa Friedman, What Is the Green New 
Deal? A Climate Proposal, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/climate/green-new-deal-questions-answers.html 
[https://perma.cc/G74T-8EUN]; Eillie Anzilotti, The Green New Deal Is a Chance to Make 
Clean Energy Accessible to All, FASTCOMPANY (June 27, 2019), https://www.fastcompany. 
com/90366185/green-new-deal-100-percent-clean-energy-will-help-economy [https://perm 
a.cc/29YD-SU5D]; Joseph W. Kane, Mark Muro & Adie Tomer, The Green New Deal 
Promises Jobs, but Workers Need to Be Ready to Fill Them, BROOKINGS (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2019/01/25/the-green-new-deal-promises-jobs 
-but-workers-need-to-be-ready-to-fill-them/ [https://perma.cc/9S5D-MU2D]. 
370 H.R. 109, 116th Cong. (2019). 
371 Id.  
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progressive or radical eco-socialist interpretation of the Green New Deal, which 
provides a more comprehensive and coordinated response to meet the economic and 
environmental objectives of the proposal.372  
Although the Green New Deal failed to move beyond a resolution, it is still 
widely discussed in both policy circles and activist communities as an important 
foundation for future legislative efforts.373 With its explicit commitment to 
promoting both environmental and economic justice for marginalized communities, 
the Green New Deal presents an important opportunity to facilitate three much 
needed reforms for GDS. First, the Green New Deal can create an affirmative right 
to clean water, remedying this enormous oversight in existing U.S. law and policy. 
Second, the Green New Deal can create a space for inclusive governance models 
that are responsive to the needs and priorities of local residents and communities. 
Finally, the Green New Deal can serve as a just economic transition opportunity for 
GDS, working to address the fiscal problems in addition to the physical problems 
plaguing these communities 
 
Creating a Right to Clean, Affordable Water 
 
Despite the devastating public health and economic impact of water insecurity, 
there is no comprehensive right to water in the United States. The Safe Drinking 
 
372 Compare Green New Deal Stimulates a Shift in Progressive Climate Change, 
CLIMATE ADVISORS, https://climateadvisers.org/climate-intel/the-green-new-deal-
stimulates-a-shift-in-progressive-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/7REF-X9KY] (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2020) (discussing how the GND addresses not only the economy, but also 
how addressing climate change should impact “economic and social priorities . . . including 
jobs, income equality, civil rights, social justice and poverty alleviation.”) with An 
Ecosocialist Green New Deal: Guiding Principles, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS OF AM. 
ECOSOCIALISTS (Feb. 28, 2019), https://ecosocialists.dsausa.org/2019/02/28/gnd-principles/ 
[https://perma.cc/YC27-6ELK] (focusing on a more dramatic impact beyond environmental 
change that would also encompass a “transition from exploitative capitalism to democratic 
ecological socialism.”); see generally Matasha Heenan & Anna Sturman, Five Orientations 
to the Green New Deal, PPE SYDNEY (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.ppesydney.net/5-
orientations-to-the-green-new-deal/ [https://perma.cc/AJ2C-HSW8] (explaining the “five 
common orientations” to the Green New Deal, including progressive and radical 
interpretations).    
373 David Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, VOX (Mar. 30, 2019, 8:23 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/12/21/18144138/green-new-deal-alex 
andria-ocasio-cortez [https://perma.cc/PW2L-47NN] (noting how the “hope” is that the 
development of the GND “can be a foundation for supporting research” and that the “more 
important thing for the draft legislation was always to have a platform for candidates to run 
on in 2020”); see also KATE ARONOFF, ALYSSA BATTISTONI, DANIEL ALDANA COHEN & 
THEA RIOFRANCOS, A PLANET TO WIN, WHY WE NEED A GREEN NEW DEAL (2019); David 
Roberts, House Democrats Just Put Out the Most Detailed Climate Plan in US Political 
History, VOX (June 30, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2020/6/30/21305891/aoc-climate-change-house-democrats-select-committee-
report [https://perma.cc/7YBV-58C3]. 
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Water Act and the Clean Water Act set minimum federal standards for water quality 
but do not create an actionable “right to water.”374 The U.S. has also refused to join 
the U.N. in recognizing water as a human right.375 Likewise, many state governments 
are also reticent to exercise their authority to create an affirmative “right to water.” 
To date, only Pennsylvania and Massachusetts have stated a “right to clean water” 
in their state constitutions.376 Even amongst these minority of jurisdictions, a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms renders the laws largely ineffective.377 Unsurprisingly, 
courts have also consistently refused to recognize a constitutional right to a clean 
environment or potable water.378  
A national right to potable water forces action, requiring the design and 
implementation of functioning water systems throughout the United States. Absent 
a national mandate, the unending cycle of water insecurity for GDS continues. Thus, 
many notable scholars across a myriad of disciplines continue to advocate 
vociferously for the creation of national legislation “that ensures access to safe and 
affordable water for drinking, hygiene, and sanitation for all Americans.”379 The 
Green New Deal can codify this affirmative national right to water redressing this 
egregious oversight.380  
 
374 See Martha Davis, Let Justice Roll Down: A Case Study of the Legal Infrastructure 
for Water Equality and Affordability, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 355, 366–85 (2016) 
(outlining various statutory and regulatory tools for access to water); see also Derrick 
Howard, The Appearance of Solidity: Legal Implementation of the Human Right to Water in 
the United States, 11 APPALACHIAN J. L. 123, 134 (2011). 
375 The U.S. has held firm in its opposition to recognizing water as a human right, 
despite its membership to the U.N. Human Rights Council during the period in which these 
resolutions were introduced and ratified. See Tamar Meshel, Environmental Justice in the 
United States: The Human Right to Water, 8 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 264, 285–86 
(2018). 
376 MASS. CONST., art. XCVII; PA. CONST., art. I, § 27. 
377 KEVIN MURRAY & SARA KOMINERS, PROGRAM ON HUM. RTS. & GLOB. ECON. NE. 
U. SCH. L., THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER FOR LAWYERS 
& COMMUNITY LEADERS 11, https://www.northeastern.edu/law/pdfs/academics/phrge/water 
-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/YGM9-L7F6] (last visited Oct. 17, 2020). 
378 See Guertin v. Michigan, 912 F.3d 907, 921–22 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Constitution 
does not guarantee a right to live in a contaminant-free, healthy environment.”); Nat’l Sea 
Clammers Ass’n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 
1 (1981) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to a pollution-free environment.”); Lake v. City 
of Southgate, No. 16-10251, 2017 WL 767879, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2017) 
(“[W]henever federal courts have faced assertions of fundamental rights to a ‘healthful 
environment’ or to freedom from harmful contaminants, they have invariably rejected those 
claims.”). 
379 Sharmila L. Murthy, A New Constitutive Commitment to Water, 36 B.C.J.L. & SOC. 
JUST. 159, 163 (2016) (emphasis in original). 
380 See generally Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
2181 (2013) (detailing how society should craft a right to water). 
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Once established, the national right to water must be fiercely protected through 
a robust administrative regime with funding and enforcement mechanisms.381 
Moreover, any such enforcement measures should be accountable and responsive to 
the interests of vulnerable communities and residents.382 The Green New Deal can 
provide a platform to incorporate inclusive governance measures and ensure greater 
accountability to community stakeholders.383  
 
Inclusive Governance by Design 
 
Water insecurity has been framed by scholars as a form of exclusion, created 
and perpetuated by government policies that, in practice, favor corporate interests384 
and better resourced communities, to the detriment of GDS.385 Specifically, a noted 
lack of democratic participation and community accountability mechanisms in state 
and local governance regimes can result in GDS being allocated unequal or 
inadequate resources.  
Professor Camille Pannu has extensively documented this phenomenon of 
exclusion through governance in California’s Central Valley.386 Despite the state’s 
constitutional commitment to providing water for residents, rural communities of 
color are often water insecure. Professor Pannu notes that the role of non-democratic 
governance structures within state and local water authorities heavily contributes to 
increased water contamination and inequitable allocation of resources—including 
funding—to vulnerable communities. Through non-democratic governance 
regimes, local and state agencies may be captured by corporate interests to the 
detriment of local residents, with little or no recourse for impacted community 
members.387 
This point is well illustrated by certain local water boards in California’s 
Central Valley.388 Water boards set water rates for customers and approve 
infrastructure projects, essentially allocating funds and distributing resources within 
 
381 Rhett B. Larson, Water Security, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 181 (2017) (noting that a 
lack of enforcement mechanisms makes the right to water “merely aspirational”). 
382 See Pannu, supra note 44, at 235. 
383 H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019). 
384 Pannu, supra note 44, at 265. 
385 Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship, supra note 97, at 2469–72. 
386 Camille Pannu, Bridging the Safe Drinking Water Gap for California’s Rural Poor, 
24 HASTINGS ENVT’L L.J. 253, 258–59 (2018); Pannu, supra note 44. 
387 Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 742 (1973) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that four corporations control the voting power of a water 
board and leaves “every individual inhabitant with a weak, ineffective voice. The result is a 
corporate political kingdom undreamed of by those who wrote our Constitution.”).  
388 See Charlotte Weiner, Untapped Opportunity: Local Water Boards and the Fight 
for Water Justice, COMTY. WATER CTR. 5 (Mar. 2018), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront. 
net/communitywatercenter/pages/52/attachments/original/1522100531/CWC_Rept_UO_03
.26.18b_web_hi.pdf?1522100531 [https://perma.cc/9UWR-RC9Y] (stating 75 of the 109 
local water boards in the southern San Joaquin Valley had not held a single election in the 
last four years and only five boards were run entirely by directors who voters elected). 
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their service area.389 Members of the water board may be elected; however, 
enfranchisement can be limited to “land-owners.”390 In this troubling scenario, a 
corporation that owns farmland in the community has the right to vote. However, 
community members, many of whom live in rental housing, have no voting rights. 
In a turn of events eerily reminiscent of Appalachian coal towns, the water board is 
elected by the corporation and, thus, prioritizes corporate objectives over the 
interests of the townspeople.391 The agricultural needs of the corporation, such as 
funding for irrigation or other agricultural projects, takes precedent over the 
concerns of residents regarding drinking water source contamination from these 
same agricultural activities.392 A community may want to object to expanding certain 
agricultural activities, reallocating that funding to mitigating existing contamination 
to drinking water sources that jeopardize the health and safety of residents. However, 
without any actual ability to control the water board or force accountability for 
negative community impact, residents are powerless to effectuate change. 
The struggles in the Central Valley reiterate that inclusive governance is 
necessary to serve as an important counterbalance to corporate dominance. The 
earlier discussion of Appalachian elites and city government failures in Flint outlines 
the role of public officials in aiding and abetting corporate dominance.393 Thus, a 
crucial step in inoculating communities against corporate monopolization of water 
resources is redesigning governance regimes to combat corporate capture of local 
government. Inclusive and democratic governance schemes must prioritize the 
interests of community members through increased community participation, 
accountability, and enforcement mechanisms. The rich literature on developing 
more democratic and accountable governance systems need not be revisited in this 
Article.394 Rather, this Article simply endorses the approach taken by many scholars, 
 
389 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 35401, 35421, 35470 (West 2020) (California Water 
Districts); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 31005, 31007 (West 2020) (County Water Districts); CAL. 
WATER CODE §§ 71592, 71611, 71614 (West 2020) (Municipal Water Districts).  
390 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 21553–2155, 35003–35006, 41000-41020 (West 2020). 
391 See generally Ezra David Romero, All Tapped Out in a Tiny California Town, NPR 
(May 2, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/05/02/403719502/all-tapped-out-in-a-tiny-
california-town [https://perma.cc/PE5V-Y46W] (describing a similar result wherein local 
residents run out of water before the large agricultural farms).  
392 See STATE OF CAL., ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT 2018 17, 58 
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/drinking_water/certlic/drinkingwater/documents/dwdocu
ments/acr_2018_final_20191220.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XN3-ZG5M] (stating that 1,271 
public water systems violated at least one drinking water standard in 2018 with 207 
community water systems, which serve at least 15 service connections or 25 yearlong 
residents, violating either maximum containment levels or treatment techniques).  
393 Supra Section I.  
394 See Audrey McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain 
of Community Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (2000); 
Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Making Participatory Governance Work for 
the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405 (2013); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of 
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
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advocating for greater community participation through increased enfranchisement, 
strong community accountability measures, and enforcement mechanisms in local 
utilities and local governance structures.395  
Although beyond the scope of this paper, we must acknowledge that reforming 
governance regimes is a herculean endeavor that requires a redistribution of power 
to the community. Previous efforts at inclusive governance, such as the Community 
Action Committees established under the Economic Opportunity Act, demonstrate 
the challenges raised by entrenched local political machines, corporate interests, and 
disconnected federal bureaucrats.396 However, the current water system continues to 
disenfranchise GDS, depriving vulnerable communities a fundamental human 
need—water.  
The Green New Deal should leverage the new funding sources for 
infrastructure projects and deploy an array of tools to mandate inclusive governance 
and enforcement as a prerequisite for receiving funding. For example, the Green 
New Deal may require structural changes to water boards to ensure community 
representation, such as mandating a certain number of seats for community members 
and generally expanding voting enfranchisement. Another requirement may be 
establishing independent, community-based advisory committees to improve 
transparency and oversight over key decisions.397 Similarly, the Green New Deal 
could mandate enforcement mechanisms that prioritize community needs and offer 
an avenue to challenge decisions that run counter to community interests.398 Thus, 
 
342 (2004); Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge of Democratic Lawyering, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1383 (2009). 
395 See Wilde Anderson, supra note 286, at 1157–79; Sabeel Rahman, Infrastructural 
Exclusion, supra note 44, at 547–61; Christopher J. Tyson, From Ferguson to Flint: In 
Search of an Antisubordination Principle for Local Government Law, 34 HARV. J. RACIAL 
& ETHNIC JUST. 1, 41–46, 51 (2018). 
396 See ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE INNER CITY: A HISTORY OF 
NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 115–18 (1995); 
SUSAN YOUNGBLOOD ASHMOORE, THE WAR ON POVERTY AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT IN ALABAMA, 1964–1972 59–61 (2008); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF 
WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 35 (1994); THE WAR ON 
POVERTY: A NEW GRASSROOTS HISTORY, 1964–1980 31–130 (Annelise Orleck & Lisa 
Gayle Hazirjian eds., 2011); MICHAEL WOODSWORTH, BATTLE FOR BED-STUY: THE LONG 
WAR ON POVERTY IN NEW YORK CITY (2016); HUEY PERRY, THEY’LL Cut OFF YOUR 
PROJECT: A MINGO COUNTY CHRONICLE (2011); Economic Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 
88-452, § 202(a), 78 Stat. 508, 516 (1964) (omitted 1967); Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for 
Empowerment: Community Development and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217, 227–
31 (1999). 
397 Pannu, supra note 44, at 264–65. 
398 The city of Baltimore recently created an Office of Water—Customer Advocacy and 
Appeals, creating an official mechanism to investigate and challenge unfair decisions by the 
water authority. See generally Baltimore City Passes Groundbreaking Affordability and 
Equity Bill, FOOD & WATER ACTION (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.foodandwateraction.org 
/food/baltimore-city-passes-groundbreaking-affordability-and-equity-bill/ [https://perma.cc 
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using the Green New Deal to mandate inclusive governance elevates the impact 
beyond mere cash infusions to directly supporting communities through democratic 
and locally accountable regulatory schemes.  
 
Just Transition—Economic Rightsizing for GDS 
 
Whether marketed as renewal, redevelopment, or reinvestment—public-
sponsored economic development programs often champion a pro-growth 
approach,399 regardless of whether this meets the needs, interests, and capacity of 
the community. Reinvestment programs for economically distressed areas largely 
center on “restructuring underperforming markets” by providing economic and other 
incentives to attract and retain private business. These initiatives include 
“smokestack chasing,”400 developing “Empowerment Zones,”401 and the recent 
frenzy surrounding Amazon HQ2.402 Repeated examples have demonstrated how 
these pro-growth programs often fail to have real economic outcomes for vulnerable 
populations, including displacing low-income groups via gentrification.403  
 
/9UAD-26EZ]; Lee, supra note 394 (discussing “participatory governance” efforts and some 
of the baseline conditions which Lee argues are necessary for such efforts to succeed). 
399 Critical commentators would say the economic system in the United States, 
neoliberal capitalism, supports the pursuit of maximum capital accumulation by elite 
interests, which requires perpetual growth. An indivisible part of this process is the 
exploitation and subordination of labor and nature. Pro-growth economic development 
policies are simply an extension of this existing system, resulting in few tangible gains for 
GDS and vulnerable populations. This discussion also implicates the degrowth and related 
discoures. See Michael M’Gonigle & Louise Takeda, The Liberal Limits of Environmental 
Law: A Green Legal Critique, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1005, 1098–99 (2013) (discussing 
degrowth and related schools); Nicholas F. Stump, Critical Legal Research and 
Contemporary Crises: Climate Change, Covid-19, and the Mass Black Lives Uprising 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) (noting that “democratically effectuated 
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The pro-growth approach largely assumes that the original economic model 
was beneficial and sustainable, ignoring any consequences resulting from dominant 
corporate interests and extractive industries, such as environmental degradation and 
attendant impacts on human health.404 This tacit endorsement of corporate 
dominance as the most effective means of economic stability prevents any 
comprehensive exploration of alternatives. Moreover, it largely excludes the voice 
of the community, preventing meaningful engagement, participation, and economic 
self-determination.405 Thus, these large, pro-growth efforts fail to fully account for 
the interests, needs, or capacity of the local community when designing and funding 
economic development efforts in GDS.406 
Despite their popularity among state actors and private interests, the 
ineffective—and often exploitive—pro-growth approach is far from the only option 
for economic reinvestment. One community-oriented alternative focuses on seeking 
a “just economic transition” for GDS. A “just economic transition” is defined as a 
“principle, process, and practice” of achieving sustainable and healthy economic and 
environmental outcomes for “fenceline workers and frontline communities.”407 
Thus, a just economic transition refutes the belief that labor and the environment are 
opposing interests that cannot co-exist. Rather, it contends that workers, residents, 
and communities need not sacrifice their health, environment, jobs, or financial 
stability in pursuit of a healthy environment and sustainable local economy. Equally 
important, a just economic transition recognizes that vulnerable communities, 
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located within GDS, are heavily impacted by economic and environmental burdens. 
Accordingly, these communities should be at the forefront of legislative efforts, both 
in terms of policy priorities and inclusive leadership. Economic transition for GDS 
requires collaboratively redesigning physical spaces and local economies.  
Self-determination is an essential component of a just economic transition. Too 
many GDS have suffered under the yoke of corporate dominance, which has enabled 
the prioritization of private interests over community well-being.408 Pro-growth 
economic development initiatives are extremely hierarchical, relying on local 
government officials to serve as proxies for the community. Thus, these efforts also 
fail to meaningfully incorporate community participation, democratic governance, 
and accountability measures discussed in the previous section.409 The recent fight 
over Amazon HQ2 in Queens, New York serves as an example of the shortcomings 
of pro-growth hierarchy. The state and city of New York collectively promised $3 
billion in tax incentives as part of their bid for Amazon’s second headquarters, slated 
to create 25,000 jobs, and diversify the local economy.410 Although stated economic 
benefits were said to be significant, little emphasis was placed on the costs to the 
community in Long Island City. Ironically, the impacts of Amazon’s relocation 
would largely be borne by a community not consulted in the design and 
implementation of the plan.411 In response, the community protested their 
disenfranchisement, voicing concerns on rising housing costs and additional strain 
on existing transit systems.412 In addition to highlighting pragmatic concerns, the 
community also voiced a moral complaint against Amazon’s anti-labor stance. The 
community directly challenged the morality of a predatory business with a clear 
monopoly receiving large public subsidies in a community struggling to preserve 
affordable housing.413 Ultimately, in the wake of fierce opposition, the deal was 
nullified by Amazon.414 As demonstrated by the events in Queens, a top-down 
approach to economic development squanders opportunities to collaborate with 
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communities as they envision and design a sustainable, local economy. It wastes 
time and resources, pursuing pro-growth initiatives that fail to yield the intended 
economic benefits, displace marginalized groups, and alienate and antagonize 
communities. Unlike Queens—a thriving community—GDS are even more 
vulnerable to risks arising from pro-growth agendas. The pro-growth approach—in 
courting private investment—can unwittingly recreate the company town dynamic 
by literally incentivizing business interests while subordinating the interests and 
voices of community members. 
GDS must find a viable economic solution, but why restrict their options to 
only pro-growth models? GDS find themselves with numerous debts, declining 
revenues, dilapidated buildings, distressed infrastructure, limited resources, and a 
shrinking population. Survival requires rebuilding the local economy, scaling to 
sustainability rather than pursuing growth for the sake of growth. What many GDS 
need is just economic transition and the Green New Deal can serve as powerful 
means to this end. Not only does the language of the resolution specifically identify 
frontline communities, it also advocates for a comprehensive solution that does not 
bifurcate the interests of labor and the environment. However, to be truly impactful 
and transformative, the Green New Deal must mandate economic self-
determination, incorporating community voices in asset mapping, design, and 
implementation of economic development efforts. By doing so, the Green New Deal 
can usher in much needed evolutions to the dominant state reinvestment approach—
a largely unsuccessful locally targeted market-based strategies—to community-
driven and managed solutions. To do anything less would result in the continued 




The plight of GDS is, in truth, a sobering and important reminder of the 
economic vulnerability of all communities. In the era of climate change and global 
pandemics, every community is in danger of becoming obsolete, given the right 
combination of political and economic factors. Permanent immunity from economic 
hardship and ecological devastation is no longer feasible. 
The rich history of most GDS and their essential role during the industrial era 
serves as compelling evidence of this economic volatility. GDS fueled the rise of the 
United States as a super-power through raw materials, a war economy, consumer 
goods, and the creation of a strong American middle class. Places like Flint were 
part of the “Arsenal of Democracy”415 and later, offered an opportunity for increased 
financial security for the average worker.416 Yet today, these same places are 
relegated to the fringes of the national economy, receiving only limited planning and 
assistance in transitioning to a post-industrial society. Much of the concentrated 
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poverty in these GDS can be linked to government actions, whether directly through 
Federal Housing Policies or indirectly through the support and subsidization of 
corporate actors. Perhaps most troubling, communities of color and low-income 
communities are overrepresented in GDS, burdening these already vulnerable 
populations to the economic and public health consequences of failing water 
infrastructure. As GDS were created by continued public and private sector 
divestment, institutional actors and policymakers should mitigate historic injustices 
perpetuated by the state.  
As of the writing of the Article, the Biden Administration and Congress have 
acknowledged the American infrastructure crisis. Each are crafting their own policy 
proposals to address these pervasive problems, including water and wastewater 
reforms. However, these nascent models fall well short of advocating for much 
needed just economic transition. Instead, these draft proposals largely increase 
funding for existing programs. In contrast, the Green New Deal can provide essential 
planning, resources, and support to help these GDS envision a sustainable future and 
transition from economically disadvantaged communities into thriving, albeit 
smaller, communities. The Green New Deal also has the potential to disrupt the 
existing narrative that pits the interests of labor against environmental concerns. 
Moreover, it can require funding and sponsored programs to be rooted in community 
participation, accountability, and transparency, an important and necessary 
departure from the dominant pro-growth economic development models. Critics 
may balk at the Green New Deal as an ambitious and daunting legislative 
undertaking, advocating for smaller victories such as focusing on decarbornization. 
However, these marginal efforts would be insufficient for GDS trapped at the nexus 
of economic and environmental devastation. 
GDS offer important lessons in the vicissitudes of prosperity and a reminder to 
temper our national hubris that such a fate can never befall our own communities. 
Climate change alone will dramatically impact economic and ecological resources, 
leaving new cities and regions marked as GDS. Absent a concerted, national effort 
to redesign economically and environmentally sustainable communities, much of 
the nation will find itself in the same predicament as Flint and McDowell County.  
